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Abstract
We extend the basic Schumpeterian endogenous growth model by allowing incum-
bents to undertake innovations to improve their products, while entrants engage in
more radical innovations to replace incumbents. Our model provides a tractable
framework for the analysis of growth driven by both entry of new rms and produc-
tivity improvements by continuing rms. Unlike in the basic Schumpeterian models,
subsidies to potential entrants might decrease economic growth because they discour-
age productivity improvements by incumbents in response to reduced entry, which may
outweigh the positive e¤ect of greater creative destruction. As the model features entry
of new rms and expansion and exit of existing rms, it also generates a non-degenerate
equilibrium rm size distribution. We show that, when there is also costly imitation
preventing any sector from falling too far below the average, the stationary rm size
distribution is Pareto with an exponent approximately equal to one (the so-called Zipf
distribution).
We thank Sam Kortum, Erzo Luttmer, Ariel Pakes, and seminar participants at MIT and Toulouse
Network on Information Technology Conference at Seattle for useful comments. We are particularly grateful
to Xavier Gabaix for numerous useful suggestions at the early stages of this project. Financial support from
the Toulouse Network on Information Technology is gratefully acknowledged.
1 Introduction
The endogenous technological change literature provides a coherent and attractive framework
for modeling productivity growth at the industry and the aggregate level. It also enables a
study of how economic growth responds to policies and market structure. A key aspect of
the growth process is the interplay between innovations and productivity improvements by
existing rms on the one hand and entry by more productive, new rms on the other. Existing
evidence suggests that this interplay is important for productivity growth. For example,
Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Foster and Krizan (2000), among others, document that
entry of new establishments (plants) accounts for about 25% of average TFP growth at the
industry level, with the remaining productivity improvements accounted for by continuing
establishments (Lentz and Mortensen (2008) nd an even more important role for entry).
These issues, however, are di¢ cult to address with either of the two leading approaches to
endogenous technological change, the expanding variety models, e.g., Romer (1990), Gross-
man and Helpman (1991a), Jones (1995), and the Schumpeterian quality ladder models, e.g.,
Segerstrom and Dinopoloulos (1990), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman
(1991b).1 The expanding variety models do not provide a framework for directly addressing
these questions.2 The Schumpeterian models are potentially better suited to studying the in-
terplay between incumbents and entrants as they focus on the process of creative destruction
and entry. Nevertheless, because of Arrows replacement e¤ect (Arrow 1962), these baseline
models predict that all innovation should be undertaken by new rms and thus does not
provide a framework for the analysis of the remaining 75% of the productivity growth due to
innovation by existing rms and establishments.3 In fact, Schumpeters own work not only
emphasized the role of creative destruction in economic growth, but also the importance of
large (here continuing) rms in innovation (see Schumpeter 1934, and Schumpeter 1942).
This paper provides a simple framework that combines these two ideas by Schumpeter
and involves simultaneous innovation by new and existing establishments.4 The model is a
1Klette and Kortum (2004) is an exception and will be discussed below.
2In the expanding variety models, the identity of the rms that are undertaking the innovation does not
matter, so one could assume that it is the existing producers that are inventing new varieties, though this
will be essentially determining the distribution of productivity improvements across rms by assumption.
3Models of step-by-step innovation, such as Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005a), and Acemoglu
and Akcigit (2006), allow innovation by incumbents, but x the set of rms competing within an industry,
and thus do not feature entry. Aghion et al. (2005b) consider an extension of these models in which there is
entry, but focus on how the threat of entry may induce incumbents to innovate.
4In the model, each rm will consist of a single plant, thus the terms establishment, plant and
rmcan be used interchangeably. Clearly, models that distinguish between plants and rms made up of
multiple plants would be better suited to empirical analysis of industry dynamics, but would also be more
complex. We are following the bulk of the endogenous technological change literature in abstracting from
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tractable (and minimal) extension of the textbook multisector Schumpeterian growth model.
A given number of sectors produce inputs (machines) for the unique nal good of the econ-
omy. In each sector, there is a quality ladder, and at any point in time, a single rm has
access to the highest quality input (machine). This rm can increase its quality contin-
uously by undertaking incremental R&D in order to increase productivity and prots.
These R&D investments generate productivity growth by continuing rms. At the same
time, potential entrants undertake radical R&D in order to create a better input and
replace the incumbent.5 A large case study literature on the nature of innovation, for exam-
ple, Freeman (1982), Pennings and Buitendam (1987), Tushman and Anderson (1986) and
Scherer (1984), documents how established rms are the main source of innovations that
improve existing products, while new rms invest in more radical and originalinnovations
(see also the discussion in Arrow 1974). Recent work by Akcigit and Kerr (2010) provides
empirical evidence from the US Census of Manufacturers that large rms engage more in
exploitativeR&D, while small rms perform exploratoryR&D (dened similarly to the
notions of incrementaland radicalR&D here).
The dynamic equilibrium of this economy can be characterized in closed-form and leads
to a number of interesting comparative static results. It generates endogenous growth in a
manner similar to the standard endogenous technological change models, but the contribu-
tion of incumbent (continuing plants) and new rms to growth is determined in equilibrium.
Although the parameters necessary for a careful calibration of the model are not currently
available, the model can plausibly generate about 75% of productivity growth from innova-
tions by continuing rms.
Despite the Schumpeterian character of the model, there may be a negative relationship
between the rate of entry of new rms and the rate of aggregate productivity growth. This
reects the importance of productivity growth by incumbents. In particular, more entry
makes incumbents less protable and they respond by reducing their R&D investments.
The resulting lower productivity growth by incumbents may outweigh the higher growth
due to entry. Consequently, taxes or entry barriers on potential entrants may increase
economic growth (while taxes on existing rms unambiguously reduce productivity growth).
This result is particularly surprising since the underlying model is only a small variant of
this important distinction.
5Continuing rms do not invest in radical R&D because of Arrows replacement e¤ect, but generate
productivity growth as they have access to a technology for improving the quality of their machines/products
and have the incentives to do so. Etro (2004) provides an alternative model in which incumbents invest in
R&D because, as in Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005a), and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006), they are
engaged in a patents race against entrants. He shows that the Arrow replacement e¤ect disappears when
incumbents are Stackelberg leaders in this race.
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the baseline Schumpeterian growth model, where growth is entirely driven by entry of new
rms. Of course, this result does not imply that entry barriers would be growth-enhancing
in practice, but isolates a new e¤ect of entry on productivity growth.
Since existing rms are involved in innovation and expand their sizes as they increase
their productivity and there is entry and exit of rms, the model, despite its simplicity, also
generates rich rm dynamics and an endogenous distribution of rm sizes. The available
evidence suggests that rm size distribution, or its tail for rms above a certain size, can be
approximated by a Pareto distribution with a shape coe¢ cient close to one (i.e., the so-called
Zipfs distribution,where the fraction of rms with size greater than S is proportional to
1=S, e.g., Lucas 1978, Gabaix 1999, Axtell 2001).6 We show that a slight variant of the
model where costly imitation is also allowed (so that new rms enter into sectors that fall
signicantly below the average in terms of quality, ensuring an endogenous lower bound
to quality), the stationary rm size distribution has a Pareto tail with a shape coe¢ cient
approximately equal to one.7
Our paper is most closely related to Klette and Kortum (2004). Klette and Kortum
construct a rich model of rm and aggregate innovation dynamics. Their model is one of
expanding product varieties and the rm size distribution is driven by di¤erences in the num-
ber of products that a particular rm produces. Klette and Kortum assume that rms with
more products have an advantage in discovering more new products. With this assumption,
their model generates the same patterns as here and also matches additional facts about
propensity to patent and di¤erential survival probabilities by size. One disadvantage of this
approach is that the rm size distribution is not driven by the dynamics of continuing plants
(and if new products are interpreted as new plants or establishments, the Klette-Kortum
model predicts that all productivity growth will be driven by entry of new plants, though
this may be an extreme interpretation, since some new products are produced in existing
6Our model also implies that rm growth is consistent with the so-called Gibrats Law,which posits
a unit root in rm growth and appears to be a good approximation to the data (see, for example, Sutton
(1997) and Sutton (1998)), even though detailed analysis shows signicant deviations from Gibrats Law for
small rms, see, for example, Hall (1987), Akcigit (2010) and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007a). See also
Dunne and Samuelson (1988), Dunne and Samuelson (1989) and Klepper (1996) for patterns of rm entry
and exit. For evidence on rm size distribution, see the classic paper by Simon and Bonini (1958) and the
recent evidence in Axtell (2001), and Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007a). The later nds a slight deviation
from Zipfs law for rms with more than 10,000 employees. For the size distribution of cities, see, among
others, Dobkins and Ioannides (1998), Gabaix (1999) and Eeckhout and Jovanovic (2002).
7Firm dynamics leading to this result are richer than those implied by many existing models, since rm
growth is driven both by the expansion of incumbents and entry (both of which are fully endogenous).
Nevertheless, as in standard Schumpeterian models, entrants are more productive, and hence larger, than
incumbents. This feature can be relaxed by assuming that it takes entrants a while to reach their higher
potential productivity, though this extension would signicantly complicate the analysis (e.g., Freeman
(1982)). See Luttmer (2010b) for a model with this feature.
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plants). The current model is best viewed as complementary to Klette and Kortum (2004),
and focuses on innovations by existing rm in the same line of business instead of the in-
troduction of new products. In practice, both types of innovations appear to be important
and it is plausible that existing large rms might be more successful in locating new product
opportunities.8 Nevertheless, both qualitative and some recent quantitative evidence suggest
that innovation by existing rms and existing lines of products are more important. Aber-
nathy (1980), Lieberman (1984), and Scherer (1984), among others, provide various case
studies documenting the importance of innovations by existing rms and establishments in
the same line of business (for example, Abernathy stresses the role of innovations by General
Motors and Ford in the car industry). Empirical work by Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and
Foster and Krizan (2000) also suggests that productivity growth by continuing establish-
ments plays a major role in industry productivity growth, while Broda and Weinstein (1996)
provide empirical evidence on the importance of improvements in the quality of products in
international trade.
Other related papers include Lentz and Mortensen (2008), Klepper (1996) and Atke-
son and Burstein (2010). Lentz and Mortensen (2008) extend Klette and Kortums model
by introducing additional sources of heterogeneity and estimate the model on Danish data.
Klepper (1996) documents various facts about rm size, entry and exit decisions, and in-
novation, and provides a simple descriptive model that can account for these facts. The
recent paper by Atkeson and Burstein (2010) also incorporates innovations by existing rms,
but focuses on the implications for the relationship between trade opening and productivity
growth. Atkeson and Burstein (2010) also discuss the interactions between incumbents and
entrants, and the rm size distribution. There are some notable di¤erences, however. First,
in their model, as in Luttmer (2007), the main interaction between entrants and incumbents
is through spillovers. Second, they characterize the stationary equilibrium and the rm
size distribution numerically (while we focus on analytical characterization). None of these
papers consider a Schumpeterian growth model with innovation both by incumbents and
entrants that can be easily mapped to decomposing the contribution of new and continuing
plants (rms) to productivity growth.
Another set of related papers include Jovanovic (1982), Hopenhayn (1992), Ericson
and Pakes (1995), Melitz (2003), Rossi-Hansberg and Wright (2007a,b), Lagos (2001), and
Luttmer (2004, 2007, 2010b,c). Many of these papers generate realistic rm size distribu-
tions based on productivity heterogeneity (combined with xed costs of operation). They
8Scherer (1984), for example, emphasizes both the importance of innovation by continuing rms (and
establishments) and that larger rms produce more products.
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typically take the stochastic productivity growth process of rms as exogenous, whereas our
focus here is on understanding how R&D decisions of rms shape the endogenous process
of productivity growth. Luttmers recent papers (2010b, 2010c) are particularly notable, as
they also incorporate exit and entry decisions, and generate empirically realistic rm size
distributions under the assumption that there are knowledge spillovers across rms (and
with exogenous aggregate growth). Our model, despite being highly tractable and only a
small deviation from the textbook Schumpeterian model, also generates a realistic rm size
distribution (with a Pareto tail as in Luttmer (2007) for rm sizes, Gabaix (1999) and Cor-
doba (2008) for cities, or Benhabib et al. (2010) for wealth distribution). To the best of
our knowledge, ours is the rst paper to analytically characterize the stationary rm size
distribution with fully endogenous growth rates (of both continuing rms and entrants).9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic environment and
characterizes the equilibrium. Section 3 looks at the e¤ects of policy on equilibrium growth
and briey characterizes the Pareto optimal allocation in this economy and compares it to
the equilibrium. In Section 4, we characterize the equilibrium rm size distribution. Section
5 presents some numerical simulations of the model and shows that under some plausible
parameterizations the model generates a large fraction of productivity growth driven by
incumbents. Section 6 concludes, while the Appendix contains several proofs omitted from
the text and some additional results.
2 Baseline Model
2.1 Environment
The economy is in continuous time and admits a representative household with the standard
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferenceZ 1
0
e t
C (t)1    1
1   dt;
where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion or the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution.
Population is constant at L and labor is supplied inelastically. The resource constraint
at time t takes the form
C (t) +X (t) + Z (t)  Y (t) ; (1)
where C (t) is consumption, X (t) is aggregate spending on machines, and Z (t) is total
expenditure on R&D at time t:
9See Luttmer (2010a) for a review of the current literature.
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There is a continuum of machines (inputs) normalized to 1 used in the production of a
unique nal good. Each machine line is denoted by  2 [0; 1]. The production function of
the unique nal good is given by:
Y (t) =
1
1  
Z 1
0
q (; t) x (; tjq)1  d

L; (2)
where x (; tjq) is the quantity of the machine of type  of quality q used in the production
process. This production process implicitly imposes that only the highest quality machine
will be used in production for each type of machine  2 [0; 1].
Throughout, the price of the nal good at each point is normalized to 1 (relative prices
of nal goods across di¤erent periods being determined by the interest rate).
The engine of economic growth here will be two forms of process innovations that lead to
quality improvements: (1) Innovation by incumbents. (2) Creative destruction by entrants.
Let q (; t) be the quality of machine line  at time t. We assume the following quality
ladderfor each machine type:
q (; t) = n(;t)q (; s) for all v and t,
where  > 1 and n (; t) denotes the number of incremental innovations on this machine line
between time s  t and time t, where time s is the date at which this particular machine type
was rst invented and q (; s) refers to its quality at that point. The incumbent has a fully
enforced patent on the machines that it has developed (though this patent does not prevent
entrants leapfrogging the incumbents quality). We assume that at time t = 0, each machine
line starts with some quality q (; 0) > 0 owned by an incumbent with a fully-enforced patent
on this initial machine quality.
Incremental innovations can only be performed by the incumbent producer. So we can
think of those as tinkeringinnovations that improve the quality of the machine. If the cur-
rent incumbent spends an amount z (; t) q (; t) of the nal good for this type of innovation
on a machine of current quality q (; t), it has a ow rate of innovation equal to  (z (; t)),
where  (z) is strictly increasing, concave in z and satises the following Inada-type assump-
tion:10
 (0) = 0 and 0 (0) =1:
Recall that such an innovation results in a proportional improvement in quality and the
resulting new machine will have quality q (; t).
10More formally, this implies that for any interval t > 0, the probability of one incremental innovation
is  (z (; t))t and the probability of more than one incremental innovation is o (t) with o (t) =t ! 0
as t! 0.
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The alternative to incremental innovations are radical innovations. A new rm (entrant)
can undertake R&D to innovate over the existing machines in machine line  at time t.11 If
the current quality of machine is q (; t), then by spending one unit of the nal good, this
new rm has a ow rate of innovation equal to (bz(;t))
q(;t)
, where  () is a strictly decreasing,
continuously di¤erentiable function, and bz (; t) is total amount of R&D by new entrants
towards machine line  at time t. The presence of the strictly decreasing function  captures
the fact that when many rms are undertaking R&D to replace the same machine line,
they are likely to try similar ideas, thus there will be some amount of externaldiminishing
returns (new entrants will be shing out of the same pond). Since each entrant attempting
R&D on this line is potentially small, they will all take bz (; t) as given. Throughout we
assume that z (z) is strictly increasing in z so that greater aggregate R&D towards a
particular machine line increases the overall likelihood of discovering a superior machine.
We also suppose that  (z) satises the following Inada-type assumptions
lim
z!0
 (z) = 0 and lim
z!1
 (z) =1:
An innovation by an entrant leads to a new machine of quality q (; t), where  > . This
is the sense in which innovation by entrants are more radical than those of incumbents.
Existing empirical evidence from studies of innovation support the notion that innovations
by new entrants are more signicant or radical than those of incumbents.12 We assume that
whether the entrant was a previous incumbent or not does not matter for its technology of
innovation or for the outcome of its innovation activities.
Simple examples of functions  () and  () that satisfy the requirements above are
 (z) = Az1  and  (z) = Bz ; (3)
with ;  2 (0; 1). We will sometimes use these functional forms to illustrate some of the
conditions and the results we present below.
Now we turn to describing the production technology. Once a particular machine of
quality q (; t) has been invented, any quantity of this machine can be produced at constant
marginal cost  . We normalize   1    without loss of any generality, which simplies
the expressions below. This implies that the total amount of expenditure on the production
11Incumbents could also access the technology for radical innovations, but would choose not to. Arrows
replacement e¤ect implies that since entrants make zero or negative prots from this technology (because
of free entry), the prots of incumbents, who would be replacing their own product, would be negative.
Incumbents will still nd it protable to use the technology for incremental innovations, which is not available
to entrants.
12However, it may take a while for the successful entrants to realize the full productivity gains from these
innovations (e.g., Freeman 1982). We are abstracting from this aspect.
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of intermediate goods at time t is
X (t) = (1  )
Z 1
0
x (; t) d; (4)
where x (; t) is the quantity of this machine used in nal good production. Similarly, the
total expenditure on R&D is
Z (t) =
Z 1
0
[z (; t) + bz (; t)] q (; t) d; (5)
where q (; t) refers to the highest quality of the machine of type  at time t. Notice also that
total R&D is the sum of R&D by incumbents and entrants (z (; t) and bz (; t) respectively).
Finally, dene px (; tjq) as the price of machine type  of quality q (; t) at time t. This
expression stands for px (; tjq (; t)), but there should be no confusion in this notation since
it is clear that q refers to q (; t), and we will use this notation for other variables as well (and
moreover, we also write z (; t) and bz (; t) without conditioning on the type and quality of
the machine at which R&D is directed, since this will not cause any confusion and simplies
the notation).
2.2 Equilibrium Denitions
An allocation in this economy consists of time paths of consumption levels, aggregate spend-
ing on machines, and aggregate R&D expenditure [C (t) ; X (t) ; Z (t)]1t=0, time paths for
R&D expenditure by incumbents and entrants [z (; t) ; bz (; t)]1v2[0;1];t=0, time paths of prices
and quantities of each machine and the net present discounted value of prots from that
machine, [px (; tjq) ; x (; t) ; V (; tjq)]1v2[0;1];t=0, and time paths of interest rates and wage
rates, [r (t) ; w (t)]1t=0. An equilibrium is an allocation where R&D decisions by entrants max-
imize their net present discounted value; pricing, quantity and R&D decisions by incumbents
maximize their net present discounted value; the representative household maximizes utility;
nal good producers maximize prots; and the labor and nal good markets clear.
Let us start with the aggregate production function for the nal good production. Prot
maximization by the nal good sector implies that the demand for the highest available
quality of machine  2 [0; 1] at time t is given by
x (; t) = px (; tjq) 1= q (; t)L for all  2 [0; 1] and all t. (6)
The price px (; tjq) will be determined by the prot maximization of the monopolist holding
the patent for machine of type  and quality q (; t). Note that the demand from the nal
good sector for machines in (6) is iso-elastic, so the unconstrained monopoly price is given
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by the usual formula with a constant markup over marginal cost. Throughout, we assume
that
 

1
1  
 1 

; (7)
so that after an innovation by an entrant, there will not be limit pricing. Instead, the entrant
will be able to set the unconstrained prot-maximizing (monopoly) price. By implication,
an entrant that innovates further after its own initial innovation will also be able to set the
unconstrained monopoly price.13 Condition (7) also implies that, when the highest quality
machine is sold at the monopoly price, the nal good sector will only use this machine type
and thus justies the form of the nal good production function in (2) which imposes that
only the highest quality machine in each line will be used.
Since the demand for machines in (6) is iso-elastic and   1  , the prot-maximizing
monopoly price is
px (; tjq) = 1: (8)
Combining this with (6) implies
x (; tjq) = qL: (9)
Consequently, the ow prots of a rm with the monopoly rights on the machine of quality
q can be computed as:
 (; tjq) = qL: (10)
Next, substituting (9) into (2), we obtain that total output is given by
Y (t) =
1
1  Q (t)L; (11)
where
Q (t) 
Z 1
0
q (; t) d (12)
13In this analysis, we are ignoring the incumbents potential incentives, after being replaced, to continue
to invest in incremental innovations with the hope of eventually catching up with a new entrant. This is
without much loss of generality, since such investment is unlikely to be protable. In particular, let eV (; tjq)
denote the value of a just replaced incumbent. Then its optimal investment in incremental innovation is
given by ez = argmaxz0  (z)eV (; tjq)  eV (; tjq)  zq. Since eV (; tjq)  V (; tjq) = vq, from the
rst-order condition on z we have ez  z =  0 1   1v. Hence, the condition
 (z)   (bz)
is su¢ cient (though of course not necessary) to ensure that it is more protable to invest in R&D for radical
innovations (where  (bz) is the equilibrium rate of success in such innovations derived below). This condition
is thus also su¢ cient to ensure that it is not protable for just-replaced incumbents to invest in incremental
innovations.
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is the average total quality of machines and will be the only state variable in this economy.
Since we have assumed that q (; 0) > 0 for all , (12) also implies Q (0) > 0 as the relevant
initial condition of our economy.14
As a byproduct, we also obtain that the aggregate spending on machines is
X (t) = (1  )Q (t)L: (13)
Moreover, since the labor market is competitive, the wage rate at time t is
w (t) =
@Y
@L
=

1  Q (t) : (14)
To characterize the full equilibrium, we need to determine R&D e¤ort levels by incum-
bents and entrants. To do this, let us write the net present value of a monopolist with the
highest quality of machine q at time t in machine line :
V (v; tjq) = Et
"Z T (;t)
t
e 
R t+s
t r(t+es)des ( (; t+ sjq)  z (; t+ s) q (t+ s)) ds
#
; (15)
where the quality q (; t+ s) follows a Poisson process such that q (; t+ s+s) = q (; t+ s)
with probability  (z (; t+ s))s (obviously with s innitesimal), and T (; t) is a stop-
ping time where a new entrant enters into the sector . So if the R&D of the entrants into
the sector is bz (; t+ s1), then the distribution of T (; t) is
Pr (T (; t)  t+ s) = Et
h
e 
R s
0 bz(;t+s1)(bz(;t+s1))ds1i :
Under optimal R&D choice of the incumbents, their value function V (; tjq) dened in (15)
satises the standard Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation:
r (t)V (; tjq) 
:
V (; tjq) = max
z(;t)0
f (; tjq)  z (; t) q (; t)
+ (z (; t)) (V (; tjq)  V (; tjq))  bz (; t)  (bz (; t))V (; tjq)g;
(16)
where bz (; t)  (bz (; t)) is the rate at which radical innovations by entrants occur in sector
 at time t and  (z (; t)) is the rate at which the incumbent improves its technology. The
rst term in (16),  (; tjq), is ow of prot given by (10), while the second term is the
expenditure of the incumbent for improving the quality of its machine. The second line
14One might be worried about whether the average quality Q (t) in (12) is well-dened, since we do not
know how q (; t) will look like as a function of  and the function q (; t) may not be integrable. This is not
a problem in the current context, however. Since the index  has no intrinsic meaning, we can rank the s
such that  7! q (; t) is nondecreasing. Then the average in (12) exists when dened as a Lebesgue integral.
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includes changes in the value of the incumbent due to innovation either by itself (at the rate
 (z (v; t)), the quality of its product increases from q to q) or by an entrant (at the ratebz (; t)  (bz (; t)), the incumbent is replaced and receives zero value from then on).15 The
value function is written with a maximum on the right hand side, since z (; t) is a choice
variable for the incumbent.
Free entry by entrants implies that we must have:16
 (bz (; t))V (; tjq (; t))  q (; t) ; and
 (bz (; t))V (; tjq (; t)) = q (; t) if bz (; t) > 0; (17)
which takes into account the fact that by spending an amount q (; t), the entrant generates
a ow rate of innovation of  (bz), and if this innovation is successful (ow rate  (bz (; t))),
then the entrant will end up with a machine of quality q, thus earning the (net present
discounted) value V (; tjq). The free entry condition is written in complementary-slackness
form, since it is possible that in equilibrium there will be no innovation by entrants.
Finally, maximization by the representative household implies the familiar Euler equation,
:
C (t)
C (t)
=
r (t)  

; (18)
and the transversality condition takes the form
lim
t!1
e 
R t
0 r(s)ds
Z 1
0
V (; tjq) d

= 0: (19)
This transversality condition follows because the total value of corporate assets is
R 1
0
V (; tjq) d.
Even though the evolution of the quality of each machine is line is stochastic, the value of
a machine of type  of quality q at time t, V (; tjq) is non-stochastic. Either q is not the
highest quality in this machine line, in which case the value function of the rm with a
machine of quality q is 0, or alternatively, V (; tjq) is given by (15).
We summarize the conditions for an equilibrium as follows:
Denition 1 An equilibrium is given by time paths of fC (t) ; X (t) ; Z (t)g1t=0 that sat-
isfy (1), (5), (13) and (19); time paths for R&D expenditure by incumbents and entrants,
fz (; t) ; bz (; t)g1v2[0;1];t=0 that satisfy (16) and (17); time paths of prices and quantities of
15The fact that the incumbent has zero value from then on follows from the assumption that, after being
replaced, a previous incumbent has no advantage relative to other entrants (see footnote 13).
16Since there is a continuum of machines  2 [0; 1], all optimality conditions should be more formally
stated as for all  2 [0; 1] except subsets of [0; 1] of zero Lebesgue measureor as almost everywhere. We
will not add this qualication to simplify the notation and the exposition.
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each machine and the net present discounted value of prots, fpx (; tjq) ; x (; tjq) ; V (; tjq)g1t=0
given by (8), (9) and (16); and time paths of wage and interest rates, fw (t) ; r (t)g1t=0 that
satisfy (14) and (18).
In addition, we dene a BGP (balanced growth path) as an equilibrium path in which
innovation, output and consumption grow at a constant rate. Notice that in such a BGP,
aggregates grow at the constant rate, but there will be rm deaths and births, and the rm
size distribution may change. We will discuss the rm size distribution in Section 4 and will
refer to a BGP equilibrium with a stationary (constant) distribution of normalized rm sizes
as a stationary BGP equilibrium. For now, we refer to an allocation as a BGP regardless
of whether the distribution of (normalized) rm sizes is stationary.
Denition 2 A balanced growth path (hereafter BGP) is an equilibrium path in which in-
novation, output and consumption grow at a constant rate.
In what follows, we will focus on linear BGP, where the value function of a rm with
quality q is linear in q, and often refer to it simply as the BGP. In particular:17
Denition 3 A linear BGP is a BGP where V (; tjq) = vq for all , t (for some v > 0).
2.3 Existence and Characterization
While a (linear) BGP always exists, because innovation by incumbents may increase the de-
mand for the inputs of other incumbents (through what is sometimes referred to as aggregate
demand externalities), there is a force pushing towards multiple BGPs. Counteracting this,
greater innovation, by increasing the growth rate, also increases the interest rate and thus
makes further innovation less protable. In the remainder of the analysis, we focus on the
case where the BGP is unique. The following is a su¢ cient condition for this.
Assumption 1 The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the representative household,
, is su¢ ciently high, i.e.,
  1
1 + minz0
n
(0(z))2
 00(z)(z)
o :
Intuitively, when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is higher, from the Euler
equation, (18) ; an increase in growth rate generated by an increase in innovation leads to
a greater rise in interest rate. This makes innovation by other incumbents less protable,
ensuring that the second force mentioned above dominates the rst one.
17We conjecture that all BGPs are in fact linear, but we are unable to prove this except when  is linear.
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Assumption 1 is not very restrictive. For example, if  () is linear, this assumption
simply requires   0, which is of course always satised. If, on the other hand,  () has the
functional form in (3), this assumption requires   .
The requirement that consumption grows at a constant rate in the BGP implies that
r (t) = r, from (18). Now focusing on linear BGP, where V (q) = vq, we have that
:
V (; tjq) =
0. Hence the functional equation that determines the value of incumbent rms (16) can be
written as
rv = L+max
z0
f (z) (  1) v   zg   bz (bz) v (20)
and assuming positive entry rate, the free-entry condition (17) can be written as
 (bz)v = 1: (21)
Let z (v)  argmaxz0  (z) (  1) v   z and bz (v)   1   1v. Then clearly z (v) is
strictly increasing in v (recall that  (z) is strictly concave) and bz (v) is strictly increas-
ing in v (recall that  (z) is decreasing in z). Moreover, since z (z) is strictly increasing
in z, bz (v)  (bz (v)) is strictly increasing in v. From the Euler equation (18), we also have
:
C (t) =C (t) = (r   ) = = g, where g is the growth rate of consumption and output.
From (11), the growth rate of output can be expressed as
:
Y (t)
Y (t)
=
:
Q (t)
Q (t)
:
From (20) and (21), in a linear BGP, for all machines, incumbents and entrants will undertake
constant R&D z (v) and bz (v), respectively. Consequently, in a small interval of time t,
there will be  (z (v))t sectors that experience one innovation by the incumbent (increasing
their productivity by ) and bz (v)  (bz (v))t sectors that experience replacement by new
entrants (increasing productivity by factor of ). The probability that there will be two or
more innovations of any kind within an interval of time t is o (t). Therefore, we have
Q (t+t) = ( (z (v))t)Q (t) + (bz (v)  (bz (v))t)Q (t)
+ (1   (z (v))t  bz (v)  (bz (v))t)Q (t) + o (t) :
Now substracting Q (t) from both sides, dividing t and taking the limit as t ! 0, we
obtain :
Q (t)
Q (t)
= (  1) (z (v)) + (  1) bz (v)  (bz (v)) :
Thus
g =  (z (v)) (  1) + bz (v)  (bz (v)) (  1) : (22)
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Finally, equations (18), (20) and (22) together give us a single equation that determines
v and thus the key value function V (; tjq) in (16):
L = v + (   1) (z (v)) (  1) v + z (v) + ( (  1) + 1) bz (v)  (bz (v)) v (23)
The right-hand side of this equation is equal to 0 at v = 0 and goes to +1 as v goes to
+1. Thus, a value of v > 0 satisfying this equation, and thus a linear BGP, always exists.
Moreover, Assumption 1 implies that the right-hand side is strictly increasing, so that this
v > 0, and thus the BGP, is unique. Given v, the other equilibrium objects are easy to
compute. The R&D rates of incumbents and entrants are simply given by
z = z (v) (24)bz = bz (v) ; (25)
and the GDP growth rate is
g =  (z) (  1) + bz (bz) (  1) ; (26)
while the BGP interest rate, again from the Euler equation (18), is obtained as
r = + g: (27)
Notice that equation (26) shows the decomposition of the aggregate growth rate, g, into
two components on the right hand side. The rst term,  (z) (  1), comes from innovation
by incumbents. The second term, bz (bz) (  1), comes from the innovation of the entrants.
The nal step is to verify that the transversality condition of the representative house-
hold, (19) is satised. The condition for this is r > g which is also satised if   1
(or less stringently, if  > [ (z) (  1) + bz (bz) (  1)] = (1  )). This discussion thus
establishes the following proposition (proof in the text).
Proposition 1 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and  > [ (z) (  1) + bz (bz) (  1)] = (1  ).
Then there exists a unique linear BGP with the value function of an incumbent with quality
q given by V (q) = vq, where v is the unique solution to (23), the aggregate growth rate g
is given by (26), and the interest rate r is given by (27). Starting with any initial condition,
the economy immediately jumps to this BGP (i.e., always grows at the rate g).
Another set of interesting implications of this model concerns rm size dynamics. The
size of a rm can be measured by its sales, which is equal to x (; t j q) = qL for all  and t.
We have seen that the quality of an incumbent rm increases at the ow rate  (z), with z
14
given by (24), while the rm is replaced at the ow rate z^ (z^). Hence, for t su¢ ciently
small, the stochastic process for the size of a particular rm is given by
x (; t+t j q) =
8<:
x (; t j q) with probability  (z)t+ o (t)
0 with probability z^ (z^)t+ o (t)
x (; t j q) with probability (1   (z)t  z^ (z^)t) + o (t)
(28)
for all  and t. Firms therefore have random growth, and surviving rms expand on average.
However, rms also face a probability of bankruptcy (extinction). In particular, denoting
the probability that a particular incumbent rm that started production in machine line  at
time s will be bankrupt by time t  s by P (t j s; ), we clearly have limt!1 P (t j s; ) = 1,
so that each rm will necessarily die eventually. The implications of equation (28) for the
stationary rm size distribution will be discussed in Section 4. For now it su¢ ces to say
that this equation satises Gibrats Law, which postulates that rm growth is independent
of size (e.g., Sutton 1997, Gabaix 1999).18
2.4 Special Case: Linear  ()
The limiting environment where  (z) is linear, i.e.,  (z) = z, is a useful special case. In this
case, equation (16) implies  (V (q)  V (q)) = 1, otherwise the incumbents will undertake
an innite amount of R&D or no R&D at all. Therefore, the value of an incumbent with
quality q simplies to
V (q) =
q
 (  1) : (29)
Moreover, from the free-entry condition (again holding as equality from the fact that the
equilibrium is interior), we have  (bz)V (q) = q. This equation implies that the BGP R&D
level by entrants bz is implicitly dened by
bz (q) = bz =  1 (  1)


for all q > 0; (30)
where  1 is the inverse of the  (z) function. Since  () is strictly decreasing, so is  1 ().
In a linear BGP, the fact that V (; tjq) = vq for all ; t and q together with (20) also implies
V (q) =
Lq
r + bz (bz) : (31)
Next, combining this equation with (29) we obtain the BGP interest rate as
r =  (  1) L  bz (bz) :
18The most common form of Gibrats Law involves rm sizes evolving according to the stochastic process
St+1 = tSt + "t, where t is a random variable with mean 1 and "t is a random variable with mean zero.
Both variables are orthogonal to St. The law of motion (28) is a special case of this general form.
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Therefore, the BGP growth rate of consumption and output in this case is obtained as:
g =
1

( (  1) L  bz (bz)  ) : (32)
Equation (32) already has some interesting implications. In particular, it determines the
relationship between the rate of innovation by entrant bz and the BGP growth rate g. In
standard Schumpeterian models, this relationship is positive. In contrast, here, since bz (bz)
is strictly increasing in bz, we have:
Remark 1 There is a negative relationship between bz and g.
We will see next that one of the implications of Remark 1 will be a positive relationship
between entry barriers and growth (when  () is linear).
3 The E¤ects of Policy on Growth
We now briey study the e¤ects of di¤erent policies on equilibrium productivity growth and
also characterize the Pareto optimal allocation in this economy.
3.1 Taxes and Entry Barriers
Since the model has a Schumpeterian structure (with quality improvements as the engine
of growth and creative destruction playing a major role), it may be conjectured that entry
barriers (or taxes on potential entrants) will have the most negative e¤ect on economic
growth. To investigate whether this is the case, let us suppose that there is a tax (or an
entry barrier)  e on R&D expenditures by entrants and a tax  i on R&D expenditure by
incumbents. Tax revenues are not redistributed back to the representative household (for
example, they nance an additive public good). Alternatively,  e can also be interpreted not
only as a tax or an entry barrier, but also as a more strict patent policy. To keep the analysis
brief, we only focus on the case in which tax revenues are collected by the government rather
than being rebated back to incumbents as patent fees.
Repeating the analysis in subsection 2.3 for the case of nonlinear return to R&D by the
incumbents, we obtain the following equilibrium conditions
z (v) = argmax
z0
 (z) (  1) v   (1 +  i) z (33)
and bz (v) =  11 +  e
v

; (34)
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where z (v) and bz (v) are the incumbent and entrant R&D rates when the policy vector is
 = ( i;  e). Combining these equations with (18) and (22), we obtain again an equation
that uniquely determines v:
L = v + (   1) (z (v)) (  1) v + (1 +  i)z (v) (35)
+( (  1) + 1) bz (v)  (bz (v)) v:
The corresponding equations for the case with linear  () are similar and we omit them
to save space. Using this characterization, we now establish:
Proposition 2 1. The BGP growth rate is strictly decreasing in  i (the tax on incum-
bents).
2. If j00 (bz )j < ( 1)( 1)(L)2(1+ i)2 , then the BGP growth rate of the economy is strictly in-
creasing in the tax rate on entrants, i.e., dg=d e > 0. In general, however, an increase
in R&D tax or entry barrier on entrants has ambiguous e¤ects on growth.
Proof. See the Appendix.
3.2 Pareto Optimal Allocations
We now briey discuss the Pareto optimal allocation, which will maximize the utility of the
representative household starting with some initial value of the average quality of machines
Q (0) > 0. As usual, we can think of this allocation as resulting from an optimal control
problem by a social planner. There will be two di¤erences between the decentralized equilib-
rium and the Pareto optimal allocation. The rst is that the social planner will not charge
a markup for machines. This will increase the value of machines and innovation to society.
Second, the social planner will not respond to the same incentives in inducing entry (radical
innovation). In particular, the social planner will not be a¤ected by the business stealing
e¤ect, which makes entrants more aggressive because they wish to replace the current mo-
nopolist, and she will also internalize the negative externalities in radical research captured
by the decreasing function .
Let us rst observe that the social planner will always pricemachines at marginal cost,
thus in the Pareto optimal allocation, the quantities of machine used in nal good production
will be given by
xS (v; tjq) =    1 qL = (1  )  1 qL:
Substituting this into (2), we obtain output in the Pareto optimal allocation as
Y S (t) = (1  )  1 QS (t)L;
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where the superscript S refers to the social planners allocation and QS (t) is the average
quality of machines at time t in this allocation. Part of this output will be spent on production
machines and is thus not available for consumption or research. For this reason, it is useful
to compute net output as
Y
S
(t) = Y S (t) XS (t) = (1  )  1 QS (t)L   (1  )  1 QS (t)L
=  (1  )  1 QS (t)L:
Given that the specication of the innovation possibilities frontier above consists of radical
and incremental innovations, the evolution of average quality of machines is
_QS (t)
QS (t)
= (  1)  zS (t)+ (  1) z^S (t)   z^S (t) ; (36)
where zS (t) is the average rate of incumbent R&D and z^S (t) is the rate of entrant R&D
chosen by the social planner. The total cost of R&D to the society is:19 

 
zS (t)

+ z^S (t) 
 
z^S (t)

QS (t) :
The maximization of the social planner can then be written as
max
Z 1
0
e t
CS (t)1    1
1   dt
subject to (36) and the resource constraint, which can be written as
CS (t) +
 
zS (t) + bzS (t)QS (t)   (1  )  1 QS (t)L:
We show in the Appendix that the social planners problem always satises
(  1)0  zS = (  1)    bzS+ bzS0  bzS : (37)
Equations (37) shows that the trade-o¤ between radical and incremental innovations for the
social planner is di¤erent from the allocation in the competitive equilibrium20
(  1)0 (z) =  (bz) ;
because the social planner internalizes the negative e¤ect that one more unit of R&D creates
on the success probability of other rms performing radical R&D on the same machine line.
19Because of convexity, it is optimal for the social planner to choose the same (proportional) level of R&D
investment in each sector, which we have imposed in writing this expression.
20This equation is derived by combining the rst order condition in (20) and equation (21) in the compet-
itive equilibrium.
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This is reected by the negative term bzS0  bzS on the right-hand side of (37). This e¤ect
implies that the social planner will tend to do less radical innovation than the decentralized
equilibrium. Since zS and bzS are constant, consumption growth rate is also constant in
the optimal allocation (thus no transitional dynamics). This Pareto optimal consumption
growth rate can be greater than or less than the equilibrium BGP growth rate, g, because
there are two counteracting e¤ects. One the one hand, the social planner uses machines
more intensively (because she avoids the monopoly distortions), and this tends to increase
gS above g. This same e¤ect can also encourage more radical R&D. On the other hand,
the social planner also has a reason for choosing a lower rate of radical R&D because she
internalizes the negative R&D externalities in research and the business stealing e¤ect. One
can construct examples in which the growth rate of the Pareto optimal allocation is greater
or less than that of the decentralized equilibrium (though only in relatively rare cases is
the equilibrium rate of Pareto optimal allocation smaller than that of the decentralized
equilibrium). The following proposition illustrates these intuitions:
Proposition 3 There exists an  > 0 such that if j00 ()j < , then the growth rate of the
Pareto optimal allocation is greater than that of the BGP growth rate, while the R&D rate of
entrants is lower than in the decentralized equilibrium. In general, however, the comparison
is ambiguous.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 3 suggests that when  () is close to linear, i.e., j00 ()j is small, taxing
entrants, by reducing their R&D, might move the decentralized equilibrium toward the social
planners allocation. This is investigated in the next proposition. In light of the importance
of creative destruction in Schumpeterian models, the following can again be viewed as a
paradoxical result.
Proposition 4 There exists an  > 0 such that, if j00 (bz )j <  and  < , the welfare of
the representative household is strictly increasing in  e.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Once again, we do not believe that erecting entry barriers or taxing entrants would
be welfare improving in practice. Instead, we highlight this result to emphasize that the
endogenous innovation responses by incumbents are potentially important.
19
4 Stationary BGP Equilibrium
As we pointed out above, the baseline model (cfr. Proposition 1) generates rm size dynam-
ics due to growth by continuing rms and entry by new rms. So far, we have focused on
the behavior of aggregate variables such as output or average quality. We now study the
stationarydistribution of rm sizes. We rst show that in the baseline model, even though
aggregate output is well behaved and grows at a constant rate, a stationary distribution does
not exist (as time goes innity, a vanishingly small fraction of rms become arbitrarily large,
making the remaining rms arbitrarily small relative to average rm size in the economy).
This is simply a consequence of the fact that because rm size growth follows Gibrats Law,
as shown by equation (28), the distribution of rm sizes will continuously expand. Yet this
is partly an articial result due to the fact that there is no lower (or upper bound) on rm
size relative to average rm size in the economy. In practice, there will be several economic
forces that pull up sectors that fall signicantly below the average productivity in the econ-
omy. In subsection 4.2, we incorporate one such mechanism, (costly) entry by imitation:
potential entrants can pay some cost to copy a technology with quality proportional to the
current average quality in the economy. This implies that when a sector falls signicantly
below average quality, entry by imitation becomes protable. We then show that the econ-
omy incorporating entry by imitation has a well-dened equilibrium. Moreover, when the
imitation technology is not very productive (such that rms entering using the technology
are initially su¢ ciently small), this equilibrium is arbitrarily close to the one that is char-
acterized in Proposition 1 and the stationary rm size distribution has a Pareto tail with a
shape parameter approximately equal to one (i.e., the so-called Zipf distribution,which,
as discussed above, appears to be a good approximation to US data).
4.1 Firm Size Distributions
Let us study the distribution of rm sizes as measured by sales, x (; t j q). Since the average
rm size grow in this economy, we will focus on the behavior of rm sizes normalized by
average size. In particular, let X1 (t)  X (t) = (1  ) =
R 1
0
x (; t j q) d, where X (t) was
dened in (4) as total expenditures on machines/inputs.21 Then, normalized rm size is
ex (; t j q) = x (; t j q)
X1 (t)
:
21Sales normalized by the equilibrium wage rate, w (t), have exactly the same behavior, since the equilib-
rium wage rate also scales with average quality, Q (t).
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Because sales are proportional to quality, we also have
ex (; t j q) = ex (t) = eq (t)  q (t)
Q (t)
;
where the rst equality makes the dependence on sector and quality implicit to simplify
notation and the last equality denes eq (t). The law of motion of normalized rm size is
similar to (28) introduced above, except that we are now keeping track of the (leading) rm
producing in a given sector rather than a given rm. Hence, after entry (the second line),
the relevant rm size is not zero, but is equal to the size of the new entrant. Noting that in
BGP, _X1 (t) =X1 (t) = g > 0, for t small, the law of motion of rm sizes can be written as
ex (t+t) =
8<:

1+gtex (t) with probability  (z)t

1+gtex (t) with probability bz (bz)t
1
1+gtex (t) with probability 1   (z)t  bz (bz)t: (38)
Proposition 5 In the baseline economy studied, there exists no stationary distribution.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The essence of Proposition 5 is that with the random growth process in (38), the distri-
bution of rm sizes will continuously expand.22
4.2 The Economy with Imitation
To ensure the existence of a stationary distribution with a minimal modication to the
baseline economy, we introduce a third type of innovation, imitation. A new rm can
enter in any sector  2 [0; 1] with a technology qe (; t) = !Q (t), where !  0 and Q (t)
is average quality of machines in the economy given by (12) and we think of ! as small,
capturing the fact that such imitation should only be protable if the sector in question has
fallen signicantly below average quality in the economy. The cost of this type of innovation
is assumed to be e!Q (t). The fact that the cost should be proportional to average quality
is in line with the structure of the model so far.23
Firm value is again given by (15) except that T (; t) in this equation is now the stopping
time where either an entrant or an imitator enters and replaces the monopolist. Put di¤er-
ently, all rms solve the maximization problem as in (16), but they also take into account
22The nature of the limiting distribution is therefore similar to the immiserizationresult for income
distribution in Atkeson and Lucas (1992) economy with dynamic hidden information; in the limit, all rms
have approximately zero size relative to the average X1 (t) and a vanishingly small fraction of rms become
arbitrarily large (so that average rm size X1 (t) remains large and continues to grow).
23This imitation technology captures the knowledge spillover channel as in Romer (1990). There are also
alternative ways of ensuring a stationary rm size distribution. For example, in a companion paper we
consider the case in which each rm has to pay a small xed costs in terms of labor to operate. See also
Luttmer (2007, 2010c).
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the possibility of entry by imitation as well. It is then straightforward that there will exist
some  > 0 such that entry by imitation is protable if
q (; t)  Q (t) ;
and thus there will be no sectors with quality less than  times average quality (clearly,
 is a function of !, and of course,  = 0 when ! = 0). The baseline model is then the
special case where ! =  = 0, i.e., where there is no imitation. We will show that a BGP
equilibrium and the stationary distribution in this economy with imitation are well-dened,
and as ! ! 0, the value function, the innovation decisions and the growth rate converge to
those characterized in the baseline economy (cfr. Proposition 1). Moreover, for ! > 0 but
small, the stationary rm size distribution has a Pareto tail.
In order to prove the existence of a stationary BGP in the economy with imitation, we
need a slightly stronger condition on  than in Assumption 1
Assumption 1b   1:
We also impose the following technical condition.
Assumption 2 Let " (z)   z0 (z) = (z) be the elasticity of the entry function  (z).
Then
max
z>0
" (z)  1  1

:
Under functional form (3) for , Assumption 2 is equivalent to   1   , and implies
that the entry function is not too elastic. This assumption is used in Lemma 4 in the
Appendix to ensure boundedness of the value function of incumbent rms when both types
of entry are present. When there is no entry by creative destruction, i.e., the economy
with only the incumbents and the imitators, the same description of the stationary BGP
goes through without Assumption 2. We also note for future reference that the Pareto
distribution takes the form
Pr [ex  y] = 1   y 
with   > 0 and y   ;  is the shape parameter (exponent) of the Pareto distribution. We
say that a distribution has a Pareto tail if its behavior for y large can be approximated by
Pr [ex  y] /  y .
Proposition 6 Suppose the BGP equilibrium in the baseline economy is described by Propo-
sition 1, in particular with v, g and ras given by to (23), (26) and (27), and Assumptions
1b and 2 are satised. Then there exist 0 <  < ,  > 0 and ! > 0 such that for any
e 2
 
; 

and ! 2 (0; !) ; there exists a BGP with the following properties:
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1. There is entry by imitation whenever q (; t)   (!)Q (t), where 0 <  (!)  ! (1  ) 1  .
2. The equilibrium growth rate is g (!) 2 (g; g +) and satises
lim
!!0
g (!) = g:
3. The value function of the incumbents above the exit threshold  (!)Q (t) in this econ-
omy, normalized by quality, V! (q) =q, converges uniformly to the value function in the
baseline economy normalized by quality, V (q) =q = v. Formally, for any  > 0
lim
!!0
sup
qQ
V! (q)  V (q)q
 = 0:
This proposition ensures that the growth rate of the economy with imitation is well
behaved and it is closeto the equilibrium of the baseline economy when ! is small. Note
also that our requirement e   (together with !  !) ensures that entry by imitation is not
protable when the entrants charge a limit price in the competition against the incumbent.
As a result, entrants use imitation to enter in a sector only when the quality of the sector
falls su¢ ciently below the average quality so that these entrants can charge the monopoly
price after entry. The condition e <  ensures that this type of entry is not too costly so
that there will be some imitation in equilibrium.
We next show that this economy admits a stationary distribution of normalized rm sizes
with a Pareto tail with the shape parameter approaching 1 as ! becomes small.
Proposition 7 The stationary equilibrium distribution of rm sizes in the economy with
imitation (characterized in Proposition 6) exists and has a Pareto tail with the shape para-
meter  =  (!) > 1 in the sense that for any  > 0 there exist B, B and ex0 such that the
density function of the rm size distribution, f (ex), satises
f (ex) < 2Bex ( 1 ); for all ex  ex0, and
f (ex) > 1
2
Bex ( 1+); for all ex  ex0:
In other words, f (ex) = ex  1' (ex), where ' (ex) is a slow-varying function. Moreover
lim
!!0
 (!) = 1:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
This result on the stationary rm size distribution has several parallels with existing
results in the literature, for example, Gabaix (1999) and Luttmer (2007, 2010b,c). In partic-
ular, as in these papers, the stationary rm size distribution is obtained by combining rm
growth following Gibrats Law with a lower bound on (relative) rm size. These papers also
have limiting results such that when the lower bound becomes negligible the size distribution
converges to Zipfs law, i.e., the tail index converges to 1 as in our proposition.24 There are
also important di¤erences, however. First, Gibrats Law is derived endogenously here from
the innovation decisions of continuing rms and entrants, and in fact, the growth rate of
output in the aggregate is endogenously determined. Second, the equilibrium is obtained
from the optimization problem of rms that recognize the possibility that there will be entry
by imitation if their quality falls signicantly relative to the average.
We next provide a sketch of the proof of Proposition 6.
4.3 Sketch of the Proof of Proposition 6
The proof consists of showing that for each e 2
 
; 

and ! 2 (0; !), there exists a
BGP with the growth rate given by g (!). The rst step proves the existence of the value
function of the incumbents under the threat of entry by imitation. In this step we show
that the relevant state variable is the relative quality of the incumbents q (; t) =Q (t). The
second step establishes the existence of and characterizes the form of the stationary rm size
distribution when the incumbents and the entrants follow the strategies determined using
the value function in the rst step. Finally, the last step establishes the existence of a BGP
with the value and investment functions derived from the rst step and the stationary rm
size distribution derived in the second step. Luttmer (2007, 2010c) follow similar steps in
proving the existence of a BGP for an economy with heterogeneous rms, but relying on
a specic closed-form of the value function and the stationary distribution. These closed-
forms in turn exploit the fact that growth is exogenous, whereas the growth rate is determined
endogenously in our economy.
There are two di¢ culties we must overcome in the rst step. The rst one is that the
value functions are given by a di¤erential equation with deviating (advanced) arguments
because the right-hand side involves V evaluated at q and q. As a result, we cannot
apply standard existence proofs from the theory of ordinary di¤erential equations. Instead,
we use techniques developed in the context of monotone iterative solution methods, see, for
24The gamma distribution used in Luttmer (2007) has a Pareto tail according to the denition in Propo-
sition 7.
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example, Jankowski (2005). The second di¢ culty arises because we need to show that the
value function satises some properties at innity. This non-standard boundary problem is
solved following the approach in Staikos and Tsamatos (1981).
Step 1: For each g 2 (g; g +), we show the existence of a value function of an
incumbent in sector  at time t which takes the form
Vg (; tjq) = Q (t) bVg q (; t)
Q (t)

; (39)
and a threshold g (!) such that an imitator will pay the cost e!Qt to imitate and enter
with quality !Qt into sector  at time t and replace an incumbent if q (; t)  g (!)Q (t).
The value of the incumbent depends only on the current average quality, Q (t) ; and the gap
between its current quality and the average quality, q (; t) =Q (t). Plugging (39) in (16), and
using the fact that
:
V g (; tjq) = gQ (t) bVg q (; t)
Q (t)

  gQ (t) bV 0g q (; t)Q (t)

;
we obtain that
(r   g) bVg (eq)  gbV 0g (eq) = Leq + max
z(;t)0
n
 (z (; t))
bVg (eq)  bVg (eq)  z (; t) eqo
 bz (; t)  (bz (; t)) bVg (eq) ; (40)
where r = +g and eq (; t) = q (; t) =Q (t). The free-entry condition for radical innovation,
(17), can then be written as
 (bz (; t)) bVg (eq (; t)) = eq (; t) :
Moreover, the free-entry condition for imitation implies
bVg (!) = e!: (41)
Since imitators will replace the incumbent in sector  at time t if q (; t)  gQ (t), we also
have the following boundary condition
bVg (g) = 0: (42)
In the Appendix, we show that when e 2
 
; 

, there is imitation in equilibrium but only
when imitators can charge monopoly price after entry. Equilibrium innovation rates, zg (eq)
and bzg (eq), can then be derived from the solution to (40).
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To establish the existence of a solution bVg (eq) to the functional equation (40), we rst
construct functional bounds, V g and V g, such that V g (eq)  bVg (eq)  V g (eq). The result on
uniform convergence of bVg (eq) then follows by establishing that V g and V g converge uniformly
to V (q) as g goes to g:
Step 2: The innovation rates, zg (eq) and bzg (eq), together with the entry rule of the
imitators and the growth rate g (!) of the average quality yields a stationary distribution
over the normalized sizes eq with distribution function F () satisfying the following conditions:
If y  !, then
0 = F 0 (y) yg  
Z y
y

 (z (eq)) dF (eq)  Z y
y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq) : (43)
If y < !, then
0 = F 0 (y) yg   F 0 () g  
Z y
y

 (z (eq)) dF (eq)  Z y
y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq) (44)
and
F (y) = 0 for y  :
We will derive these expressions formally in the Appendix, and to make the dependence
on the growth rate of average quality explicit, we will write the solution as Fg. Intu-
itively, given y > 0, the mass of rms with size moving out of the interval (; y) consists
of rms (sectors) with size between
 
y

; y

that are successful in incremental innovation,R y
y

 (z (eq)) dF (eq), and rms (sectors) with size between   y

; y

, where there is a radical in-
novation,
R y
y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq). When y < !, we must also add the mass of rms being
replaced by imitators with relative quality !. This mass consists of rms that are in the
neighborhood of , do not experience any innovation, and are therefore drifted to below 
due to the growth rate g of the average quality Q; it is equal to F 0 () g. By denition of
a stationary distribution, the total mass of rms moving out of the interval (; y) must be
equal to the mass of rms moving into the interval. This mass consists of rms around y
that do not experience any innovation and thus drift into this interval due to growth at the
rate g (given by F 0 (y) yg).
Step 3: From this analysis, we obtain an implied growth rate of the average product
quality g0 =
:
Q=Q as a function of the current growth rate g; from the innovation rates,
zg (eq), and bzg (eq), imitation threshold g, and the equilibrium stationary distribution Fg. In
particular,
g0 (g) =
(  1)EFg [ (z (eq)) eq] + (  1)EFg [bzg (eq)  (bzg (eq)) eq]
1  gF 0g (g) (!   g) :
: (45)
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This formula, derived formally in the Appendix, is similar to the decomposition of growth in
(26). The numerator combines the innovation rates of incumbents and entrants, respectively
(  1)EFg [ (z (eq)) eq] and (  1)EFg [bzg (eq)  (bzg (eq)) eq], where EFg is used as a shorthand
for the integrals using the density dFg (eq) as in (43) and (44). The denominator, on the other
hand, is the contribution of imitation to growth. The higher is the gap !   g, the more
important is this component. Finally the equilibrium growth rate g (!) is a solution to the
equation
D (g)  g0 (g)  g = 0;
where g0 (g) is given by (45). In the Appendix, we establish the existence of a solution g (!)
to this equation.
5 Simulations
5.1 Growth Decompositions
The explicit characterization of equilibrium enables us to obtain simple expressions for how
much of productivity growth is driven by creative destruction (innovation by entrants) and
how much of it comes from productivity improvements by incumbents. In particular, we can
use equation (26), which decomposes growth into the component coming from incumbent
rms (the rst term) and that coming from new entrants (the second term).
Unfortunately, some of the parameters of the current model are di¢ cult to pin down
with our current knowledge of the technology of R&D. Hence, instead of a careful calibration
exercise, here we provide some illustrative numbers. Let us normalize population to L = 1
and choose the following standard numbers:
g = 0:02,  = 0:01, r = 0:05 and  = 2;
where , the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, is pinned down by the choice of the other
three numbers. The rst three numbers refer to annual rates (implicitly dening t = 1
as one year). The remaining variables will be chosen so as to ensure that the equilibrium
growth rate is indeed g = 0:02. As a benchmark, let us take
 = 2=3;
which implies that two thirds of national income accrues to labor and one third to prots.
The requirement in (7) then implies that  > 1:7. We will use the benchmark value of  = 3
so that entry by new rms is su¢ ciently radicalas suggested by some of the qualitative
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accounts of the innovation process (e.g., Freeman 1982, Scherer 1984). Innovation by incum-
bents is taken to be correspondingly smaller, in particular  = 1:5, so that productivity gains
from a radical innovation is about four times that of a standard incrementalinnovation by
incumbents (i.e., (  1) = (  1) = 4): For the functions  (z) and  (z), we adopt the func-
tional form in (3) and choose the benchmark values of  = 0:95 and  = 0:5. The remaining
two parameters A and B will be chosen to ensure g = 0:02 with two third coming from the
innovation of the incumbents and one third coming from the entrants, i.e., the rm term in
(22)  (z) (  1) equals 0:0133 and the second term bz (bz) (  1) equals 0:0067. Given
the value of , we obtain bz (bz) equals 0:0033. However, varying these parameters shows
that the model can lead to quite di¤erent decompositions of productivity growth between
incumbents and entrants, and a more careful empirical investigation of the t of the model
is necessary (though the parameters that would be required for this need to be estimated).
5.2 Stationary Distribution in the Economy with Imitation
We now present some simulations to illustrate the form of the stationary distribution of rm
sizes in the economy with imitation. We will see that the rm size distribution is indeed well
approximated by a Pareto distribution with a coe¢ cient close to 1.
In addition to the parameters from the last subsection, let us set e = 15 and ! = 0:1.
This leads to a BGP growth rate of g (!) = 0:0205 > g = 0:02. The threshold for imitation
is  (!) = 0:045 < ! (1  ) 1  , which ensures that, following entry, imitators can charge
the monopoly price.
We can then compute that the rm size distribution will have a Pareto tail coe¢ cient
given by  (!) = 1:12. Figure 5.2 depicts the stationary rm size distribution by plotting
the following relationship (similar to the one in Gabaix (1999)):
log (rank) = C    log (size) :
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Figure 5.2 then presents the value functions of the incumbents in the economy with imi-
tation (solid line), and also for reference, it plots the value function in the baseline economy
without imitation (dashed line). Under entry by imitation, the value of the incumbents is
zero if bq = q=Q  : We can see that the value of incumbent rms without the imitation
is everywhere above the value function in the economy with imitation. Though intuitive,
this is not a general feature, because creative destruction may also decline in the presence
of entry by imitation, and this may increase the value of incumbents.
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Finally, Figure 5.2 presents the contributions of the incumbents and the entrants to the
aggregate growth of product quality. About two-thirds of the aggregate growth is still due to
incumbents. Notice that the incumbents with lower quality invest more because of the threat
of entry by imitation.25 This threat also makes the radical innovation (creative destruction)
25This is similar to the escape competition e¤ect in Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005a) and
Acemoglu and Akcigit (2006).
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less pro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6 Conclusion
A large fraction of US industry-level productivity growth is accounted for by existing rms
and continuing establishments. Standard growth models either predict that most growth
should be driven by new innovations brought about by entrants (and creative destruction)
or do not provide a framework for decomposing the contribution of incumbents and entrants
to productivity growth. In this paper, we proposed a simple modication of the basic Schum-
peterian endogenous growth models that can address these questions. The main departure
from the standard models is that incumbents have access to a technology for incremental
innovations and can improve their existing machines (products). A di¤erent technology can
then be used to generate more radical innovations. Arrows replacement e¤ect implies that
only entrants will undertake R&D for radical innovations, while incumbents will invest in
incremental innovations. This general pattern is in line with qualitative and quantitative
evidence on the nature of innovation.
The model is not only consistent with the broad evidence but also provides a tractable
framework for the analysis of productivity growth and of the entry of new rms and the
expansion of existing rms. It yields a simple equation that decomposes productivity growth
between continuing establishments and new entrants. Although the parameters to compute
the exact contribution of di¤erent types of establishments to productivity growth have not
yet been estimated, the use of plausible parameter values suggests that, in contrast to basic
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endogenous technological change models and consistent with the US data, a large fraction
but not all of productivity growth is accounted by continuing establishments.
The comparative static results of this model are also potentially di¤erent from those of
existing growth models, because innovation by incumbents also responds to changes in para-
meters and policy. For example, despite the presence of entry and creative destruction, the
model shows that entry barriers or taxes on potential entrants may increase the equilibrium
growth rate of the economy. This is because, in addition to their direct negative e¤ects, such
taxes create a positive impact on productivity growth by making innovation by incumbents
more protable.
Finally, because the model features entry by new rms and expansion and exit of exist-
ing rms, it also generates an equilibrium rm size distribution. The resulting stationary
distribution of rm sizes approximates the Pareto distribution with an exponent of one (the
so-called Zipf distribution) observed in US data (e.g., Axtell 2001).
The model presented in this paper should be viewed as a rst step in developing tractable
models with endogenous productivity processes for incumbents and entrants (which take
place via innovation and other productivity-increasing investments). It contributes to the
literature on endogenous technological change by incorporating additional industrial organi-
zation elements in the study of economic growth. An important advantage of the approach
developed here is that it generates predictions not only about the decomposition of produc-
tivity growth between incumbents and entrants, but also about the process of rm growth,
entry and exit, and the equilibrium distribution of rm sizes. The resulting stochastic process
for rm size is rather simple and does not incorporate rich rm dynamics that have been
emphasized by other work, for example, by Klette and Kortum (2004), who allow rms
to operate multiple products, or by Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003) and Luttmer (2007),
who introduce a nontrivial exit decision (due to the presence of xed costs of operation)
and also allow rms to learn about their productivity as they operate. Combining these
rich aspects of rm entry and exit dynamics with innovation decisions that endogenize the
stochastic processes of productivity growth of incumbents and entrants appears to be an
important area for future theoretical research. A more important line of research, would be
a more detailed empirical analysis of the predictions of these various approaches using data
on productivity growth, exit and entry of rms. The relatively simple structure of the model
presented in this paper should facilitate these types of empirical exercises. For example, a
version of the current model, enriched with additional heterogeneity in rm growth, can be
estimated using rm-level data on innovation (patents), sales, entry and exit.
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7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. Part 1. We need to show that dg=d i < 0, where the growth rate
g is given by (22). Di¤erentiating this expression with respect to  i, we obtain:
dg
d i
= (  1)0 (z (v))

@z (v
)
@ i
+
@z (v
)
@v
dv
d i

+ (  1) d
dv
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) dv
d i
= (  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@ i
+

(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) dv
d i
(46)
The rst-order condition for the optimal investment decision of the incumbents, (33), implies that
0 (z (v)) (  1) v = 1 +  i: (47)
Di¤erentiating (47) with respect to  i; we have 00 (z (v)) (  1) v @z (v) =@ i = 1, which implies
that
@z (v
)
@ i
=
1
00 (z (v)) (  1) v < 0:
So a tax on the incumbentsinvestment will directly reduce their investment, which contributes to
the reduction in the aggregate growth rate, i.e., the rst term in (46) is negative. However, we need
to ensure that the indirect e¤ect on aggregate growth resulting from the equilibrium change in the
value of the incumbents v, i.e., the second term in (46), does not o¤set the direct e¤ect.
To study the second term in (46), we need to understand how the equilibrium value v changes
due to  i, i.e., dv=d i. Notice that v is determined in (35) as
L = ( ; v) ;
where we dene
 ( ; v)  v + (   1) (z (v)) (  1) v + (1 +  i)z (v) + ( (  1) + 1) bz (v)  (bz (v)) v: (48)
Therefore, by the implicit function theorem
dv
d i
=   @
@ i
=
@
@v
;
Plugging this identity in (46) we obtain
dg
d i
= (  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@ i
 

(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) @
@ i
=
@
@v
;
where
@
@v
= + (   1) (z (v)) (  1) + (   1)0 (z (v)) v@z (v)
@v
(  1) + (1 +  i)@z (v)
@v
+( (  1) + 1) bz (v)  (bz (v)) + ( (  1) + 1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@v
v > 0; (49)
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and
@
@ i
= (   1)0 (z (v)) @z (v)
@ i
(  1) v + (1 +  i)@z (v)
@ i
+ z (v) :
The desired result, dg=d i < 0 is thus established if
(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@ i
@
@v
<

(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) @
@ i
:
Since @z (v) =@v > 0,@ (bz (v)  (bz (v))) =@v > 0; @z (v) =@ i < 0 and z > 0, it is then su¢ cient
to show that
(  1)0 (z (v)) @
@v
>

(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v)))
  (   1)0 (z (v)) (  1) v + (1 +  i) (50)
From (49), we have that
@
@v
> (   1)0 (z (v)) v@z (v)
@v
(  1) + (1 +  i)@z (v)
@v
+ ( (  1) + 1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@v
v:
(51)
Combining (51) with (50), we see that this is equivalent to
( (  1) + 1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@v
> (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v)))+(   1) (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) :
This is always true as  (  1) + 1 > (  1) + (   1) (  1) :
Part 2. We need to show that dg

de
> 0 when
00 (z (v)) < ( 1)( 1)(L)2(1+ i)2 . Once again
di¤erentiating the expression for g in (22) with respect to  e, we obtain
dg
d e
= (  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
dv
d e
+(  1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@v
dv
d e
+ (  1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@ e
= (  1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@ e
+

(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) dv
d e
:
(52)
Similarly to the rst part, we decompose the change in the aggregate growth g, due to a tax
 e on the entrants, into two components. The rst component, which corresponds to the rst
term in (52), is the direct e¤ect of the tax on the investment of the entrants. (34) implies that
@ (bz (v)  (bz (v))) =@ e < 0, and thus the tax on entrants will reduce the entrants investment.
However, we will show that the indirect e¤ect resulting from an increase in the incumbentsvalue
v, i.e., the second term in (52), will more than o¤set the direct e¤ect. To do so we also need to
understand how the equilibrium value v changes due to  e, i.e., dv=d e.
Using the implicit function theorem again, we obtain
dv
d e
=   @
@ e
=
@
@v
;
33
where the expression for  in (48) implies that @@e  ( (  1) + 1)
@(bz (v)(bz (v)))
@e
v. Given that
@ (bz (v)  (bz (v))) =@ e < 0 we have
dg
d e
/   (  1) @
@v
+
( (  1) + 1) v

(  1)0 (z (v)) @z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v)))
=   (  1) @
@v
+
( (  1) + 1)

(1 +  i)
@z (v
)
@v
+ (  1) @
@v
(bz (v)  (bz (v))) v (53)
in which the second equality follows from (47). We also have
v
@
@v
= + (   1)0 (z (v)) v2@z (v)
@v
(  1) + (1 +  i)v@z (v)
@v
  (1 +  i) z (v)
+ ( (  1) + 1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@v
v2
= + (1 +  i)v
@z (v)
@v
  (1 +  i) z (v) + ( (  1) + 1) @ (bz (v)  (bz (v)))
@v
v2:
The last equality also follows from (47) : Di¤erentiating (47) with respect to v, we have
v
@z (v)
@v
=
0 (z )
 00 (z ) =
1 +  i
(  1) v   00 (z (v)) :
This can now be combined with (53) to yield
dg
d e
/   (  1)L+ (1 +  i)
 
1 +  i
(  1) v   00 (z (v)) + (  1) z (v)
!
:
Because from (35), v < L=, the right-hand side of this expression is greater than
  (  1)L+ (1 +  i)
2
(  1) L
  00 (z (v)) :
This implies that dg=d e > 0 provided that
 00 (z (v)) < (  1) (  1) (L)
2
 (1 +  i)
2 ;
establishing the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Following from the analysis in the text, the current-value Hamiltonian for the social planner is
bH  QS ; zS ; bzS ; S =

 (1  )  1 QSL   zS + bzSQS1    1
1   +
S
 
(  1)  zS+ (  1) bzS  bzSQS :
The necessary conditions for a candidate interior solution are given by
@ bH
@zS
=  QS

 (1  )  1 QSL   zS + bzSQS  + S (  1)0  zSQS
@ bH
@bzS =  QS  (1  )  1 QSL   zS + bzSQS  + S (  1)    bzS+ bzS0  bzSQS ;
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and
S   :S = @
bH
@QS
=

 (1  )  1 L   zS + bzS (1  )  1 QSL   zS + bzSQS 
+S
 
(  1)  zS+ (  1) bzS  bzS ; (54)
as well as a relevant transversality condition. @
bH
@zS
= 0 implies
S (  1)0  zS =  (1  )  1 QSL   zS + bzSQS  : (55)
Di¤erentiating both sides with respect to t, we obtain:
:

S
(  1)0  zS =  (1  )  1 L   zS + bzS    QS  1 :QS (t)
=

 (1  )  1 L   zS + bzS    QS 
  (  1)  zS+ (  1) bzS (t)   bzS : (56)
Plugging in
:

S and S from (56) and (55) into (54) and dividing both sides by

 (1  )  1 L   zS + bzS 
we obtain

 
(  1)  zS+ (  1) bzS  bzS+  =
 (1  )  1 L   zS + bzS (  1)0  zS+  (  1)  zS+ (  1) bzS  bzS :
Moreover, from the two rst-order conditions @
bH
@zS
= 0 and @
bH
@bzS = 0; we have (37)
(  1)0  zS = (  1)    bzS+ bzS0  bzS :
These two equations determine zS and bzS , and thus the Pareto allocation. The two equations above
also gives an expression for the Pareto optimal growth rate
gS =

 (1  )  1 L  zS

(  1)0  zS+ (  1)  zS  (  1)  bzS2   bzS  

:
When  () is linear, this growth rate is equal to
gS =
 (1  )  1 L (  1)  (  1)  bzS2 0  bzS  

>
L (  1)  

>
L (  1)  bz (bz)  

= g;
so that the growth rate in the socially planned allocation is greater than the BGP growth rate, g,
as dened in (32). The remark in the text that the social planner uses machines more intensively
(because she avoids the monopoly distortions) can be seen by the fact that the rst term in gS ,
(1  )  1 L (  1), is strictly greater than the rst term in g in (32), since (1  )  1 > 1).
Notice also that (37) for linear  implies

 bzS > (  1)
  1 >
(  1)

=  (bz) :
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Therefore, bz > bzS , i.e., entry is too high in the decentralized equilibrium compared to the Pareto
optimal level of entry. These inequalities also hold when
00 () <  for  su¢ ciently small,
completing the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. The net present discounted utility of the representative household is
given by
W =
Z 1
0
e t
C (t)1    1
1   dt /
1
1  
C (0)
  g (1  )
Therefore:
dW
d e
/ 1
1  
dC (0)
d e
(  g (1  )) + dg
d e
C (0) :
We can choose 1 from Proposition 2 such that when
00 (z (v)) < 1, we have dg=d e > 0:
Therefore, dW=d e > 0 provided that    g (1  ) < 2 for some 2 > 0. Setting  = min f1; 2g
establishes the desired result.
Derivation of the functional qquation for the stationary distribution . Consider
the evolution of the highest quality machine in each sector. In the case of entry without imitation,
we have
q (t+t) =
8<:
q (t) with probability 1   (z (eq (t)))t  bz (eq (t))  (bz (eq (t)))t+ o (t)
q (t) with probability  (z (eq (t)))t+ o (t)
q (t) with probability bz (eq (t))  (bz (eq (t)))t+ o (t) ;
where eq (t)  q (t) =Q (t) is the normalized quality, and we have used the fact that average quality
Q (t) grows at a constant rate g. Moreover, because of imitation when q (t)  Q (t), q (t+) jumps
to !Q (t), ! > . Therefore the evolution of the normalized quality, eq (t), can be expressed as
eq (t+t) =
8>><>>:
q (t) (1  gt) + o (t)
with probability 1   (z (eq (t)))t  bz (eq (t))  (bz (eq (t)))t+ o (t)
q (t) (1  gt) + o (t) with probability  (z (eq (t)))t+ o (t)
q (t) (1  gt) + o (t) with probability bz (eq (t))  (bz (eq (t)))t+ o (t) ;
and whenever eq (t)  , it jumps immediately to eq (t+) = ! > . Denoting the stationary distribu-
tion of normalized quality by F (y), we have that, for y > !,
F (y) = Pr (eq (t+t)  y) = E 1feq(t+t)yg = E E 1feq(t+t)ygjeq (t) :
We rewrite the iterated expectation as
E
2664E
2664
1feq(t)(1 gt)y;1 (z(eq(t)))t bz(eq(t))(bz(eq(t)))t;eq(t)(1 gt)>g
+1feq(t)(1 gt)y;(z(eq(t)))t;eq(t)(1 gt)>g
+1feq(t)(1 gt)y;bz(eq(t))(bz(eq(t)))t;eq(t)(1 gt)>g
+1feq(t)(1 gt)g
 eq (t)
3775
3775
= E
26664E
26664
1feq(t)y(1+gt);1 (z(eq(t)))t bz(eq(t))(bz(eq(t)))t;eq(t)>(1+gt)g
+1feq(t) y (1+gt);(z(eq(t)))t;eq(t)>(1+gt)g
+1feq(t) y (1+gt);bz(eq)(bz(eq))t;eq(t)>(1+gt)g
+1feq(t)(1+gt)g
 eq (t)
37775
37775
= E
26664
(1   (z (eq (t)))t  bz (eq)  (bz (eq))t)1fq(t)y(1+gt);eq(t)>(1+gt)g
+ (z (eq (t)))t1feq(t) y (1+gt);eq(t)>(1+gt)g
+bz (eq)  (bz (eq))t1feq(t) y (1+gt);eq(t)>(1+gt)g
+1feq(t)(1+gt)g:
37775 (57)
36
Replacing the last expectations by integrals and using the fact that F (eq) = 0 for eq  , we obtain
F (y) =
Z y(1+gt)
(1+gt)
(1   (z (eq))t  bz (eq)  (bz (eq))t) dF (eq)
+
Z y

(1+gt)
(1+gt)
 (z (eq))tdF (eq) + Z y (1+gt)
(1+gt)
bz (eq)  (bz (eq))tdF (eq)
+ F ( (1 + gt)) : (58)
For t small, the right-hand side can be written as
F (y) = F (y) + F 0 (y) ygt
 
Z y

 (z (eq)) dF (eq)t  Z y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq)t
+
Z y


 (z (eq)) dF (eq)t+ Z y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq)t:
Now eliminating F (y) from both sides of the last equation, dividing t and taking the limit as
t! 0, we obtain
0 = F 0 (y) yg  
Z y
y

 (z (eq)) dF (eq)  Z y
y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq)
as in (43). For y < !, we proceed exactly as above except that now the terms 1feq(t)(1 gt)g do
not appear in (57) due to the fact that all imitating rms will have normalized quality ! exceeding
y. We thus obtain
0 = F 0 (y) yg   F 0 () g  
Z y
y

 (z (eq)) dF (eq)  Z y
y

bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) dF (eq)
as in (44).
Proof of Proposition 5. Evaluating (44) for the special case in which  = ! = 0, g = g,
z (eq)  z and bz (eq)  bz, we obtain the functional equation determining the stationary distribution
in the baseline economy:
0 = F 0 (y) yg    (z)

F (y)  F
y


  bz (bz)F (y)  F y


: (59)
The only possible solution to this equation is F (y) = 1 

 
y

. Substituting this into (59) gives
 (z) (   1) + bz (bz) (   1)  g = 0:
Since 
 1
 and
 1
 are strictly increasing in  and by denition of g
, we have equality at  = 1.
Therefore  = 1 is the unique solution. In some ways, this result looks quite remarkable, since
it generates a stationary rm size distribution given by a Pareto distribution with an exponent of
one, i.e., Pr [ex  y] = 1   y with   > 0. But the Pareto distribution is only dened for all y   ,
thus   should be the minimum normalized rm size. However (38) shows that it is possible for the
normalized size of a rm ex to tend to 0. Therefore   should be equal to 0, which implies that there
does not exist a stationary rm size distribution.
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Derivation of the Growth Equation. The growth of the average product quality Qt comes
from three sources: innovation from the incumbent rms, from the innovative entrants and from
the imitators. Recall the denition of Qt
Qt =
Z 1
0
q (v; t) dv
where q (v; t) is the highest quality in sector v. We suppose that the investment of the incumbents
in each sector is z (eq) and of the entrants is bz (eq), where eq is the quality relative to the average
quality that grows at the rate g from time t to t+t. Then we have
Qt+t =
Z 1
0
q (v; t+t) dv
=
Z 1
0;q(v;t)Q(t)(1+gt)
0@ z  q(v;t)Qt tq (v; t) + bz  q(v;t)Qt   bz  q(v;t)Qt tq (v; t)
+

1  

z

q(v;t)
Qt

t  bz  q(v;t)Qt   bz  q(v;t)Qt t q (v; t)
1A dv
+
Z 1
0;Q(t)<q(v;t)<Q(t)(1+gt)
0@ z  q(v;t)Qt tq (v; t) + bz  q(v;t)Qt   bz  q(v;t)Qt tq (v; t)
+

1  

z

q(v;t)
Qt

t  bz  q(v;t)Qt   bz  q(v;t)Qt t!Q (t)
1A dv:
Expanding the right hand side around t = 0, we have
Qt+t = Qtt
Z 1
0


z

q (v; t)
Qt

q (v; t)
Qt
dv + Qtt
Z 1
0
bzq (v; t)
Qt


bzq (v; t)
Qt

q (v; t)
Qt
dv
+
Z 1
0;q(v;t)Q(t)(1+gt)

1  

z

q (v; t)
Qt

t  bzq (v; t)
Qt


bzq (v; t)
Qt

t

q (v; t) dv
+
Z 1
0;Q(t)<q(v;t)<Q(t)(1+gt)

1  

z

q (v; t)
Qt

t  bzq (v; t)
Qt


bzq (v; t)
Qt

t

!Q (t) dv:
We can rearrange to decompose the growth of average quality into three di¤erent components:
innovation from incumbents, from entrants, and from imitators:
Qt+t = Q (t) + (  1)Qtt
Z 1
0


z

q (v; t)
Qt

q (v; t)
Qt
dv| {z }
Innovation from Incumbents
+ (  1)Qtt
Z 1
0
bzq (v; t)
Qt


bzq (v; t)
Qt

q (v; t)
Qt
dv| {z }
Innovation from Entrants
+
Z 1
0;Q(t)<q(v;t)<Q(t)(1+gt)
0@ 1  z  q(v;t)Qt t
 bz  q(v;t)Qt   bz  q(v;t)Qt t
1A (!Q (t)  q (v; t)) dv:
| {z }
Innovation from Imitators
We rewrite this growth accounting in term of stationary distribution with cumulative distribution
function F () over bq = qQ >  and probability density function f ()
Q (t+t) = Q (t) + (  1)Q (t)
Z
 (z (eq)) eqdF (eq)t
+ (  1)Q (t)
Z bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) eqdF (eq)t
+ F ( (1 + gt)) (!   )Q (t) :
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So
g = (  1)EF [ (z (eq)) eq] + (  1)EF [bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) eq] + gf () (!   ) :
Equivalently
g =
(  1)EF [ (z (eq)) eq] + (  1)EF [bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) eq]
1  f () (!   )
as in (45). When ! = 0 we have
g = (  1)EF [ (z (eq)) eq] + (  1)EF [bz (eq)  (bz (eq)) eq] ;
and when z (eq)  z and bz (eq)  bz
g = (  1) (z) + (  1) bz (bz)
as in (26), given that E [eq] = 1.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Let us rst dene Ii (ev)  maxz0  (z) ev   z and Ie (u)  1u 1   1u. Intuitively, Ii (ev) ; forev = (  1) v; is the value (or proportional to the value) of incumbent rms from undertaking
incremental innovation. Ie (u) is the rate of entry by entrants with radical innovations. There are
one-to-one mappings from the investment technologies  and  to the functions Ii and Ie. Using
these notations we can also dene vg as a solution of the equation
v =
L+ Ii ((  1) v)
r + Ie (v)
; (60)
in which r = + g: The following lemma establishes some properties of vg around the equilibrium
values (v; g). We can easily see that vgq is the value function of an incumbent with product quality
q, given the interest rate r, the entry behavior of entrants and without imitators, i.e., functional
equation (20).
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1b is satised.There exists  > 0 such that for each g 2 (g  ; g +) ;
there exists a unique vg 2 (v  ; v +) that satises equation (60). Moreover vg is strictly de-
creasing in g.
Proof. We rewrite equation (60) as  (v; g) = 0 where
 (v; g) = v (+ g + Ie (v))  L  Ii ((  1) v) :
As we show below, @ (v; g) =@v > 0, so the implicit function theorem guarantees the existence
and uniqueness of (g; vg) in the neighborhood of (g; v), establishing the rst part of the lemma.
The second part follows immediately given that @ (v; g) =@g = v > 0 and also by the implicit
function theorem
dvg
dg
=  @ (v
; g) =@g
@ (v; g) =@v
:
We use direct calculation to show @ (v; g) =@v > 0. Indeed, we have
@ (v; g)
@v
= + g +
@(vIe (v))
@v
  I 0i ((  1) v) (  1) :
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First of all, by denition of Ie, vIe (v) = 1
 1   1
v

, strictly increasing in v, so @(v
Ie(v))
@v > 0:
Second of all, applying the envelope theorem to Ii (ev) implies I 0i ((  1) v) =  (z (v)). From the
denition of g in (26) and Assumption 1b, we have
g  g
>  (z) (  1)
= I 0i ((  1) v) (  1) :
These two inequalities @(v
Ie(v))
@v > 0 and g
 > I 0i ((  1) v) (  1) imply
@ (v; g)
@v
>  > 0:
We prove Proposition 6 in three steps sketched in the body of the paper:
Step 1: We state the existence of a value function bVg (eq) in the following lemma
Lemma 2 (Existence of Value Function) Suppose the BGP equilibrium in the baseline econ-
omy is described by Proposition 1, in particular with v, g and ras given by (23), (26) and (27),
and Assumption 1b and Assumption 2 are satised. Then there exist 0 <  <  and  > 0 such
that for any e 2
 
; 

, g 2 [g; g +] and ! > 0, we can nd g  ! (1  )
1 
 and a value
function bVg (eq) that satises (40), (41) and (42).
Below, we show that bVg (eq) = eqUg (ln (eq)  ln g), where Ug is shown to exist using Schauders
xed point theorem, satises these properties. The following lemma shows the existence of Ug.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumptions 1b and 2 are satised. Let  2 (0; g) small enough to apply
Lemma 1. Then for each g 2 [g  ; g +] ; there is a solution Ug  0 to the functional equation
rU (p) + gU 0 (p)
= L+max
z0
f (z) (U (p+ ln)  U (p))  zg   bz (p)  (bz (p))U (p) ; (61)
where r = + g,  (bz (p))U (p+ ln) = 1, and U satises the boundary conditions
U (0) = 0 and lim
p!1U (p) = vg; (62)
where vg is dened in Lemma 1. Moreover, Ug is equicontinuous in g over any nite interval.
Notice that the conditions (40) and (42) on bVg translate into the conditions (61) and the rst
part of (62) on U . In order to apply Schauders xed point theorem, we need to nd a subset z
of continuous functions U : [g  ; g +] R+ ! R that satisfy the boundary conditions (62),
and a continuous mapping T that summarizes the functional equation (61). We need T (z) to be
a compact subset of z. z and T are constructed in Denitions 5 and 6. Lemmas 4 and 5 show
that T (z) is a compact subset of z. Lemma 6 shows that the mapping T is continuous. Together
with the Schauders xed point theorem, these properties ensure the existence of U:
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Denition 4 C0 ([g  ; g +] R+;R) denotes the Banach space of continuous functions
U : [g  ; g +] R+ ! R and U (g; 0) = 0 for all g 2 [g  ; g +] with the norm
kUk = sup
g gg+
sup
0p1
jU (g; p)j :
Denition 5 Let z denote the subset of continuous functions U 2 C0 ([g  ; g +] R+;R)
with U (g; 0) = 0 and
vg   vge p  U (g; p)  vg + vge p for all p  0. (63)
Denition 6 For each function u = U (g; :) 2 C0 (R+;R) consider the operator Tg
Tgu 2 C0
 
R+;R

satises the following ordinary di¤erential equation26
g (Tgu)
0 (p) + (rg + Ie (u (p+ ln))) (Tgu) (p)
= L+ Ii (u (p+ ln)  Tgu (p)) : (64)
with the initial condition Tgu (0) = 0. Notice that
rg = + g: (65)
Here bz (p) is dened such that  (bz (p))u (p+ ln) = 1. The operator T is dened by
TU (g; p) = TgU (g; p) :
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumptions 1b and 2 are satised, then T (z)  z.
Proof. Let kg (p) = vg + vge p and kg (p) = vg + vge p: By denition, for each U 2 z, we have
kg (p)  U (g; p)  kg (p) :
Let kg (p) = TgU (g; p) then, also by denition (64) implies that
gk0g (p) = L  Ii (u (p+ ln)  kg (p))  (rg + Ie (u (p+ ln))) (Tgu) (p)
 L  Ii
 
kg (p+ ln)  kg (p)
   rg + Ie  kg (p+ ln) kg (p) :
So if
gk
0
g (p) > L  Ii
 
kg (p+ ln)  kg (p)
   rg + Ie  kg (p+ ln) kg (p) ; (66)
then kg (p) < kg (p) for all p > 0 given that kg (0) = 0 < kg (0). Similarly, if
gk0g (p) < L  Ii
 
kg (p+ ln)  kg (p)
   rg + Ie  kg (p+ ln) kg (p) (67)
26Standard results from the theory of ordinary di¤erential equations ensure the existence and
uniqueness of Tgu (p) if u 2 z dened below.
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then kg (p) > kg (p) for all p > 0 given that kg (0) = 0 = kg (0).
Below we will use Assumption 2 to show (66) and (67). Indeed, the two inequalities can be re-
written as (for all 0 < x  vg):
 gx > L+ Ii

(  1) vg +

1    1

x

 

rg + Ie

vg    x

(vg + x) ; (68)
and
gx < L+ Ii

(  1) vg  

1    1

x

 

rg + Ie

vg + 
 x

(vg   x) : (69)
By denition of vg in (1), we have equalities at x = 0. It is su¢ cient to show that the derivative of
the left hand side of (68) is strictly greater than the derivative of its right hand side. Or equivalently,
 g > I 0i

(  1) vg +

1    1

x

1    1

  rg   Ie

vg    x

+ I 0e

vg    x

 vg:
Equation (65) now implies that rg > g and, from Assumption 1b,   1; yields
I 0i

(  1) vg +

1    1

x

1    1

 0:
It remains to show that
Ie

vg    x

vg  I 0e

vg    x

 ;
or 
vg    x

 1
min "Ie
 vg:
or
min "Ie
min "Ie + 1
   (70)
Similarly, it is su¢ cient to show that the derivative of the left hand side of (69) is strictly greater
than the derivative of its right hand side. Or equivalently,
g < I 0i

(  1) vg  

1    1

x

1  1 

+ rg + Ie

vg + 
 x

  I 0e

vg + 
 x

 vg:
This is true if
 
vg + 
 x
  1min "Ie  vg, or equivalently, if
min "Ie   : (71)
Since
Ie =
1

  1;
Assumption 2 implies both (70) and (71).
Lemma 5 T (z) is a compact subset of C0 ([g  ; g +] R+;R).
Proof. Suppose ffng1n=1  z, we will show that we can extract a subsequence from fTfng1n=1
that converges to f 2 z. First, there exists a constant K > 0 such that kUk  K for all U 2 z.
So (for all g and p): @@pTfn
 =  ddpTgfn (g; p)
  L+ Ii ((+ 1)K) + (+  (g +) + Ie (K))Kg  
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Second, Dg (p) = @@g (Tfn (p)) is the solution of
gD0g (p) + Tfn (p) +

drg
dg
+ Ie (fn (p+ ln))

Tfn (p)
=
 
I 0i (fn (p+ ln)  Tfn (p))  (rg + Ie (fn (p+ ln)))

Dg (p)
So Dg (p) is uniformly bounded over [g  ; g +] [0;M ] for any M > 0. Therefore, for each
M = 1; 2; ::::; we have fTfn (g; p)g1n=1 is equicontinuous over
C0 ([g  ; g +] [0;M ] ;R) :
We construct subsequences

fTfMkgk1

M1
of fTfngn1 as follows:
 M = 1: Since fTfngn1 is equicontinuous over [g  ; g +]  [0;M ], there exists a
subsequence fTf1kg1k=1 that converges uniformly to fM 2 C0 ([g  ; g +] [0;M ] ;R)
over [g  ; g +] [0;M ].
 M =)M+1: Since fTfMkg1k=1 is equicontinuous over [g  ; g +][0;M + 1], there ex-
ists a subsequence
n
Tf(M+1)k
o1
k=1
that converges uniformly to fM+1 over [g
  ; g +]
[0;M + 1]. Because of the subsequence property: fM+1

[g ;g+][0;M ] = f

M :
Let f : [g  ; g +]R+ ! R be dened by fj[g ;g+][0;M ] = fM for allM 2 Z+. By
denition of f we have for each p  0 and g 2 [g  ; g +] ; limM!1 TfMM (g; p) = f (g; p)
so f 2 z:
We now show that the subsequence fTfMM g1M=1 converges to f; i.e.,
lim
M!1
kTfMM   fkC0([g ;g+]R+;R) = 0:
Indeed, for any  > 0, given (63) in the denition ofz, there exists a p1 > 0 such that jTfMM (g; p)  vgj <

2 and jf (g; p)  vgj < 2 for all p  p1. So for all p  p1 and g 2 [g  ; g +], we have
jTfMM (g; p)  f (g; p)j < . Given p1, there exists an M1 such that jTfMM (g; p)  f (g; p)j < 
for all p1  p  0,g 2 [g  ; g +] and M M1 . Therefore, for all p  0, g 2 [g  ; g +]
and M M1, we have jTfMM (g; p)  f (g; p)j < .
Lemma 6 The mapping T is continuous over z.
Proof. Suppose fn ! f , by the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem, we have Tfn converges
pointwise toward Tf . We next prove that
lim
n!1 kTfn   TfkC0([g ;g+]R+;R) = 0:
First, notice that fTfng is a Cauchy sequence: Because, for any  > 0 fTfng it is a Cauchy sequence
over any restricted interval [0; p1] so we can nd M such that
kTfm   TfnkC0([g ;g+][0;p1];R) <  for all m;n M
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and by denition of z we can choose p1 such that
kTfm (p; g)  Tfn (p; g)k < kTfm (p; g)  vgk+ kTfn (p; g)  vgk
<

2
+

2
=  for all p  p1:
Second, by the relative compactness of T (z), from any subsequence of fTfng there is subsequence
fhMg of fTfng that converges to h over C0 ([g  ; g +] R+;R). Since fhMg also converges
pointwise to Tf we have h = Tf . Therefore
lim
M!1
khM   TfkC0([g ;g+]R+;R) = 0:
Thus
lim
n!1 kTfn   TfkC0([g ;g+]R+;R) = 0:
Proof of Lemma 3. Given Lemma 4, 5, 6 we can apply the Schauders xed point the-
orem to show that T admits a xed point U in z: TU = U . Or equivalently for each g 2
[g  ; g +], u () = U (g; :) satises u (0) = 0 and (61). The limit at innity in (62) fol-
lows directly from the denition of z. Finally, equicontinuity is a consequence of the fact that
U () 2 C0 ([g  ; g +] R+;R).
Now, we nd g such that the value function bVg (eq) = eqUg (ln (eq)  ln g) satises (40), (41) and
(42):
Proof of Lemma 2 (Existence of the Value Function). Let us choose  <  such that
 > Ug

1  

log

1
1  

and
 < Ug

1  

log

1
1  

+ 

;
where  > 0. Given that U (g; p) is equicontinuous in g 2 [g; g +], we can choose  su¢ -
ciently small such that we can apply Lemma 3 and moreover Ug

1 
 log

1
1 

<  <  <
Ug

1 
 log

1
1 

+ 

for all g 2 [g; g +]. Therefore, for any e 2
 
; 

there exists an
!g 2

1 
 log

1
1 

; 1  log

1
1 

+ 

such that e = Ug (!g). For each !, let
g = != exp (!g) < ! (1  )
1 
 : (72)
and let bVg (eq) = eqUg (ln (eq)  ln g). Then bVg satises (40), (41) and (42):
Given the existence of U (g; p), for each g 2 [g; g +], we dene
zg (p) = argmax
z0
(Ug (p+ )  Ug (p)) (z)  z
and bzg (p) =  1Ug (p+ ln)


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Since limp!1 Ug (p) = vg, we have
lim
p!1 zg (p) = z (vg) and limp!1 bzg (p) = bz (vg) :
Armed with the existence of the value function and the corresponding investment decisions, we are
ready to prove the second step
Step 2: In Lemma 7, we show the existence of the stationary distribution under the form
F 0g (eq) = fg (eq) = hg(ln eq ln g)eq . Moreover, in Lemma 10, we show that fg satises the asymptotic
Pareto property in Proposition 7. And lastly, for the purpose of the last step in proving the existence
of a stationary BGP, in Lemma 12 we show that the mean rm size goes to innity as g approaches
g, i.e., limg#g
R1
0 eqdFg (eq) =1:
We look for a stationary distribution Fg (y) that solves equations (43) and (44) with z (eq) =
zg (ln eq   ln g) and bz (eq) = bzg (ln eq   ln g). Let hg (p) = gepF 0g (gep), the equations (43) and (44)
become:
If p > ln!g
0 = hg (p) g  
Z p
p ln
 (zg (ep))hg (ep) dep  Z p
p ln
bzg (ep)  (bzg (ep))hg (ep) dep: (73)
If p  ln!g
0 = hg (p) g   hg (0) g  
Z p
p ln
 (zg (ep))hg (ep) dep  Z p
p ln
bzg (ep)  (bzg (ep))hg (ep) dep: (74)
We also have hg (p) = 0 for all p  0. The conditions for Fg to be a well-dened distribution isZ
hg (p) dp = 1:
The following lemma shows the existence and uniqueness of the stationary distribution.
Lemma 7 Given the investment strategies zg (p) ; bzg (p), the stationary distribution hg (p) exists
and is unique.
Proof. Di¤erentiate both side of the integral equations on hg, we have
gh0g (p) =  (zg (p))hg (p)   (zg (p  ln))hg (p  ln)
+ bzg (p)  (bzg (p))hg (p)  bzg (p  ln)  (bzg (p  ln))hg (p  ln) :
We rewrite this equation as
gh0g (p)  ( (zg (p)) + bzg (p)  (bzg (p)))hg (p) =   (zg (p  ln))hg (p  ln)
  bzg (p  ln)  (bzg (p  ln))hg (p  ln) :
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Using the variation of constant formula, this equation yields a unique equation for 0  p < !g
given hg (0). For p  !g the equation also yields a unique solution, however the initial condition is
now
hg (!g) =
1
g
Z !g
!g ln
 (zg (ep))hg (ep) dep+ 1
g
Z !g
!g ln
bzg (ep)  (bzg (ep))hg (ep) dep:
Since the system is linear in the initial condition hg (0), therefore, there exists a unique hg (0) such
that
R1
0 hg (p) dp = 1. Notice that Lemma 10 below implies that
R1
0 hg (p) dp <1:
Having established the existence and uniqueness of the stationary distribution hg, we now
characterize some of its properties. In particular, Lemma 3 suggests that the investment policies
zg (p) ; bzg (p) are approximately constant as p goes to innity. So the evolution of rm (sector) size
assembles Gibrats law for large rms. As a result, the stationary distribution hg should have a tail
distribution close to Pareto. The following lemmas prove that conjecture.
Let zg = z (vg) and bzg = bzg (vg). Then for each g > g, dene the  (g) as the unique number
 satisfying
g = 
 
zg
    1

+ bzg  bzg    1 ;
because the right hand side is strictly increasing in . We will show below that  (g) is the Pareto
index of the Pareto tail of the stationary distribution hg.
Lemma 8  (g) = 1 and  (g) > 1 for all g > g and in the neighborhood of g:
Proof. By denition of g we have g = 
 
zg

(  1) + bz  bzg (  1), therefore  (g) = 1.
For g > g
g > 
 
zg

(  1) + bzg  bzg (  1) :
Thus  (g) > 1. To show the previous inequality, notice that the left hand side is strictly increasing
in g and the right hand side is strictly increasing in vg. However, Lemma 1 shows that vg is strictly
decreasing in g, so the right hand side is strictly decreasing in g. Combining this fact with the fact
that at g = g the two sides are equal, we obtain the desired inequality.
Lemma 9 For each  > 0, there exists a  > 0 such that
1
g

 
zg

+ 

    1
   +

1
g
bzg  bzg+      1   < 1
and 
1
g

 
zg
   +   1
+ 
+

1
g
bzg  bzg   +   1+  > 1:
Proof. This is true given 1g
 
zg

 1
 +
1
g bzg  bzg  1 = 1 and the functions
    1
   ;
    1
  
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are strictly increasing in   .
For each  > 0 let  > 0 be such a . Given the limit result in Lemma 3, there exists a
p0 = p0 ()  !g such that, for all p  p01g (zg (p)) + 1g bzg (p)  (bzg (p))

 

1
g

 
zg

+
1
g
bzg  bzg < 
and 1g (zg (p  ln))  1g  zg
 < 1g bzg (p  ln)  (bzg (p  ln))  1g bzg  bzg
 < :
We will now state and prove a key lemma. Proposition 7 then follows as a corollary of this
lemma.
Lemma 10 (Tail Index) For any  > 0, there exist B, B and p0 such that
hg (p) < 2Be
 ((g) )p, for all p  p0
and
hg (p) >
1
2
Be ((g)+)p; for all p  p0;
In other words, hg (p) = e (g)p'g (p), where 'g (p) is a slow-varying function.
Proof of the Tail Index Lemma. Let us dene B ()  maxp0pp0+ln hg (p) e( )p and
B ()  minp0pp0+ln hg (p) e(+)p. We will show that
hg (p) < 2B () e
 ( )p; for all p  p0
and
hg (p) >
1
2
B () e (+)p; for all p  p0:
These inequalities hold for p0  p  p0 + ln by denition. We will next show that they also
hold for all p  p0. To obtain a contradiction, suppose that there is p > p0 + ln such that
hg (p)  2B () e ( )p. Consider the inmum of those p, then
hg (p) = 2B () e
 ( )p:
In the other hand, the equation determining hg implies
hg (p) =
1
g
Z p
p ln
 (zg (ep))hg (ep) dep+ 1
g
Z p
p ln
bzg (ep)  (bzg (ep))hg (ep) dep
<
Z p
p ln

1
g

 
zg

+ 

2B () e ( )epdep+ Z p
p ln

1
g
bzg  bzg+  2B () e ( )epdep
= 2B ()

1
g

 
zg

+ 

    1
   e
 ( )p + 2B ()

1
g
bzg  bzg+      1   e ( )p
< 2B () e ( )p:
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This yields a contraction. Therefore
hg (p) < 2B () e
 ( )p; for all p  p0:
Similarly, we can show that
hg (p) >
1
2
B () e (+)p; for all p  p0:
As a consequence, if g > g, then  (g) > 1; Lemma 10 for  = (g) 12 impliesZ
hg (p) dp < C
Z
e 
1+(g)
2
pdp <1:
In order to proceed to step 3, we need to show that the mean of rm size converges to innity
as g approaches g from above, i.e., limg !g
R1
0 hg (p) e
pdp = 1. This is intuitively true using
Lemma 7, because hg (p) / e p so
R1
0 hg (p) e
pdp / R10 1dp = 1. Unfortunately, this does not
work formally because Lemma 7 only provides e (1 )p as a lower bound. So, the following lemma
gives a better lower bound of hg in order to prove the limiting result.
Lemma 11 (Tail Index at the Limit) There exists B and p0 such that
hg (p) >
1
2
B
e p
p
; for all p  p0:
Proof. Let us choose B > 0 such that the inequality holds for p0  p  p0 + ln. We will show
that they also hold for all p  p0 using contradiction.
First, we choose p0 such that, using Lemma 4 there exists a constant C > 0 that satises
 (zg (ep)) >   zg  gCe epbzg (ep)  (bzg (ep)) > bzg  bzg  gCe ep
8ep  p0:
Suppose that there is p > p0 + ln such that
hg (p) <
1
2
B
e p
p
:
Consider the inmum of those p, then
hg (p) =
1
2
B
e p
p
:
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In the other hand, the equation determining hg implies
hg (p) =
1
g
Z p
p ln
 (zg (ep))hg (ep) dep+ 1
g
Z p
p ln
bzg (ep)  (bzg (ep))hg (ep) dep
>
Z p
p ln

1
g

 
zg
  Ce ep 1
2
B
e epep dep+
Z p
p ln

1
g
bzg  bzg  Ce ep 12Be epep dep
=
1
2
B
1
g

 
zg

(  1) e
 p
p
+
1
2
B
1
g
bzg  bzg (  1) e pp
+
1
2
BC 0
e p
p2
  1
2
BC 00e (1+

2)p
>
1
2
B
e p
p
:
(We also choose p0 such that C 0 e
 p
p2
  12C 00e (1+

2)p > 0 for all p  p0). This yields a contraction.
Therefore
hg (p) >
1
2
B
e p
p
; 8 p  p0:
So, a direct consequence of this lemma isZ 1
0
hg (p) e
pdp >
Z 1
p0
1
2
B
1
p
dp =1:
We can use the results above to prove the following property of hg, which will be crucial to
show the existence of the equilibrium growth rate of the economy with imitation, i.e., the last step
in proving Proposition 6.
Lemma 12 hg is uniformly continuous in g: And for g > g
 (g) =
Z 1
0
hg (p) e
pdp <1
is continuous in g. Moreover limg#g  (g) = +1.
Proof. The fact that hg is uniformly continuous in g is a result of uniform continuity of fUgg, thus
of zg () and bzg () as well.  (g) is nite given Proposition 7.  (g) is continuous by the Lebesgue
dominated convergence theorem. Finally, as we show above  (g) = +1 and by the uniform
continuity of hg; we have limg#g  (g) = +1.
For any ! > 0, g is dened as in (72). The corresponding stationary distribution is fg (eq) =
hg(ln eq ln g)eq and policy functions are z (eq) = zg (ln eq   ln g) and bz (eq) = bzg (ln eq   ln g)for all eq  g:
Given g, g0 as dened in (45) can be written using hg and the change of variable eq = gep:
g0 =
(  1) R1g eq (z (eq)) fg (eq) deq + (  1) R1g eqbz (eq)  (bz (eq)) fg (eq) deq
1  gfg (g) (!   g)
= g
(  1) R10 ep (zg (p))hg (p) dp+ (  1) R10 epbzg (p)  (bzg (p))hg (p) dp
1  hg (0) (!   g)
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We obtain an BGP if g0 = g.
Step 3: We next show that there exists g (!) such that
D (g (!))  g0 (g (!))  g (!) = 0:
Let ,  and  be chosen as in Lemma 2 and such that Lemma 8 for g 2 [g; g +]. Consider
! > 0 su¢ ciently small such that for all 0 < ! < !,  = !!g+ satises

(  1) R10 ep (zg+ (p))hg+ (p) dp+ (  1) R10 epbzg+ (p)  (bzg+ (p))hg+ (p) dp
1  hg+ (0) (!   )
< g +: (75)
We will show that, for each ! such that 0 < ! < !, there exists a g = g (!) 2 (g; g +) such
that g0 = g and that
lim
!!0
g (!) = g:
Indeed, as in the proof of Lemma 2 there exists a !g such that !g 2

1 
 log

1
1 

; 1  log

1
1 

+ 

and Ug (!g) = e. Set g = != exp (!g) and dene
D (g) = g
(  1) R10 ep (zg (p))hg (p) dp+ (  1) R10 epbzg (p)  (bzg (p))hg (p) dp
1  hg (0) (!   g)   g:
Using Lemma 12, we can show that D (g) is continuous in g. Moreover, by (75), we have
D (g +) < 0;
and, Lemma 12 implies
lim
g!gD (g) = +1:
Therefore, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a g (!) such that D (g) = 0. Moreover
if g (!) > g +$ as ! ! 0, we also have
g
(  1) R10 ep (zg (p))hg (p) dp+ (  1) R10 epbzg (p)  (bzg (p))hg (p) dp
1  hg (0) (!   g) ! 0
(because g ! 0). This implies D (g (!)) <   (g +$) < 0, yielding a contradiction with the fact
that D (g (!)) = 0. Thus
lim
!!0
g (!) = g:
The uniform convergences of the value and policy functions are obtained immediately given the
bounds on the value function in (63), which themselves converge uniformly. 
50
References
William Abernathy. The Productivity Dilemma. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
1980.
Daron Acemoglu and Ufuk Akcigit. State dependent intellectual property right policy. NBER
Working Paper, No. 12775, 2006.
Philippe Aghion, Nick Bloom, Richard Blundell, Rachel Gri¢ th, and Pe-
ter Howitt. Competition and innovation: An inverted-u relation-
ship. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(2):701728, 2005a. URL
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/0033553053970214.
Philippe Aghion, Robin Burgess, Stephen Redding, and Fabrizio Zilibotti. Entry liberal-
ization and inqequality in industrial performance. Journal of the European Economic
Association Papers and Proceed, 3:291302, 2005b.
Philippe Aghion, Christopher Harris, Peter Howitt, and John Vickers. Competition, imita-
tion and growth with step-by-step innovation. Reviews of Economic Studies, 68:467492,
2001.
Philippe Aghion and Peter Howitt. A model of growth through creative
destruction. Econometrica, 60(2):323351, 1992. ISSN 00129682. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2951599.
Ufuk Akcigit. Firm size, innovation dynamics and growth. University of Pennsylvania,
working paper, 2010.
Ufuk Akcigit and William R. Kerr. Growth through heterogeneous innovations. University
of Pennsylvania, working paper, 2010.
Kenneth Arrow. The Limits of Organization. Norton, New York, 1974.
Kenneth J. Arrow. The economic implications of learning by doing. Review of Economic
Studies, 29:155173, 1962.
Andrew Atkeson and Ariel Burstein. Innovation, rm dynamics and international trade.
2010.
Andrew Atkeson and Robert Lucas. On e¢ cient distribution with private information. Re-
view of Economic Studies, 59:42753, 1992.
51
R.L. Axtell. Zipf distribution of us rm sizes. Science, 293:18181820, 2001.
Eric J Bartelsman and Mark Doms. Understanding productivity: Lessons from longitudinal
microdata. Journal of Economic Literature, 38:569594, 2000.
Jesse Benhabib, Alberto Bisin, and Shenghao Zhu. The distribution of wealth and scal
policy in economies with nitely lived agents. NYU working paper, 2010.
Christian Broda and David E. Weinstein. Globalization and the gains from variety. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, CXXI(2):541585, 1996.
Juan Cordoba. On the distribution of city sizes. Journal of Urban Economics, 2008.
L. Dobkins and Yannis Ioannides. Dynamic evolution of the u. s. city size distribution. In
J. M. Huriot and J. F. Thisse, editors, The Economics of Cities. Cambridge University
Press, New York, 1998.
Mark J. Roberts Dunne, Timothy and Larry Samuelson. Patterns of rm entry and exit in
us manufacturing industries. Rand Journal of Economics, 19:495515, 1988.
Mark J. Roberts Dunne, Timothy and Larry Samuelson. The growth and failure of us
manufacturing plants. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104:671698, 1989.
Jan Eeckhout and Boyan Jovanovic. Knowledge spillovers and inequality. American Eco-
nomic Review, 92:12901307, 2002.
Richard Ericson and Ariel Pakes. Markov perfect industry dynamics: A framework for
empirical work. Review of Economic Studies, 62:5382, 1995.
Federico Etro. Innovation by leaders. Economic Journal, 114:281303, April 2004.
John Haltiwanger Foster, Lucia and C.J. Krizan. Aggregate procuctivity growth: Lessons
from microeconomic evidence. NBER Working Paper No.6803, 2000.
Charles Freeman. The Economics of Industrial Innovation. MIT Press Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts, 1982.
Xavier Gabaix. Zipfs law for cities: An explanation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114:
739767, 1999.
Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy.
Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1991a.
52
Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Quality ladders in the theory of growth. Review of
Economic Studies, 68:4361, 1991b.
Bronwyn Hall. The relationship between rm size and rm growth in the us manufacturing
sector. The journal of industrial economics, 35, 1987.
Hugo A. Hopenhayn. Entry, exit, and rm dynamics in long run equilibrium. Econometrica,
65(5):11271150, 1992.
Tadeuz Jankowski. Advanced di¤erential equations with nonlinear boundary condition. Jour-
nal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, 304:490503, 2005.
Charles I. Jones. R and d-based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Economy,
103:759784, 1995.
Boyan Jovanovic. Selection and evolution of industry. Econometrica, 50:649670, 1982.
Steven Klepper. Entry, exit, growth, and innovation over the product life cy-
cle. The American Economic Review, 86(3):562583, 1996. ISSN 00028282. URL
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2118212.
Tor Jakob Klette and Samuel Kortum. Innovating rms and aggregate innovation.
Journal of Political Economy, 112(5):p986  1018, 2004. ISSN 00223808. URL
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=truedb=bthAN=14637140site=ehost-live.
Ricardo Lagos. A model of tfp. NYU Working Paper, 2001.
Rasmus Lentz and Dale T. Mortensen. On the size distribution of business rms. Econo-
metrica, 76(6):13171373, 2008.
M. B. Lieberman. The learning curve and pricing curve and chemical processing industries.
Rand Journal of Economics, 15:213228, 1984.
Robert. E. Jr. Lucas. On the size distribution of business rms. Bell Journal of Economics,
9(2):508523, 1978.
Erzo Luttmer. The size distribution of rms in an economy with xed entry costs. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, working paper, 2004.
Erzo Luttmer. Selection, growth and the size distribution of rms. Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 122:11031144, 2007.
53
Erzo Luttmer. Models of rm heterogeneity and growth. Annual Review of Economics, 2:
547576, 2010a.
Erzo Luttmer. On the mechanics of rm growth. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
working paper, 2010b.
Erzo Luttmer. Technology di¤usion and growth. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis,
working paper, 2010c.
Mark Melitz. The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and aggregate industry
productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):16951725, 2003.
J. M. Pennings and A. Buitendam. New Technology As Organizational Innovation: The
Development and Di¤usion of Microelectronics. Bollinger, Cambridge, MA, 1987.
Paul Romer. Endogenous technical change. Journal of Political Economy, 98(5):71102,
1990.
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg andMark L.J. Wright. Establishment size dynamics in the aggregate
economy. American Economic Reviews, 97(5):16391666, 2007a.
Esteban Rossi-Hansberg and Mark L.J. Wright. Urban structure and growth. Review of
Economic Studies, 74:597624, 2007b.
Frederick Scherer. Innovation and Growth: Schumpeterian Perspectives. MIT Press Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, 1984.
Joseph A. Schumpeter. The Theory of Economic Development. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1934.
Joseph A. Schumpeter. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. Harper and Brothers, New
York, 1942.
T.C. A. Anant Segerstrom, Paul S. and Elias Dinopoloulos. A schumpterian model of the
product life cycle. American Economic Reviews, 80:10771091, 1990.
Herbert. Simon and C. P. Bonini. The size distribution of business rms. American Economic
Reviews, 48:607617, 1958.
V.A. Staikos and Tsamatos. On the terminal value problem for di¤erential equations with
deviating arguments. Archivum Mathematicum, 21(2):4350, 1981.
54
John Sutton. Gibrats legacy. Journal of Economic Literature, 35:4059, 1997.
John Sutton. Technology and Market Structure:Theory and History. MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, 1998.
M. L. Tushman and P. Anderson. Technological discontinuities and organizational environ-
ments. Administrative Science Quarterly, 31:439465, 1986.
55
